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Executive Summary 
 
Dr Monica Franco-Santos & Prof Mike Bourne 
When we think about the impact of performance targets on behaviour the words 
“high but achievable” immediately spring to mind. We need to set targets at a high 
level to stretch staff, but the target needs to be perceived as achievable if the staff 
are going to accept the stretch. However, in real life the world is much more 
complex than this. 
We know from previous research that the use of performance measurement is wide 
spread in UK companies, with significant use of the Balanced Scorecard and near 
universal use of Key Performance Indicators (Franco-Santos, Bourne & Huntington 
2004). Targets and measures, often reinforced by incentive systems, then drive 
performance. 
So performance measurement, target setting and incentives are all important issues 
but often there is disquiet about targets and whether they have the right impact on 
people’s behaviour and organisational performance. In this research, we have 
reviewed the literature, undertaken four detailed case studies in a sales environment 
and conducted a survey to better understand the factors that influence perception of 
target difficulty. Our findings are as follows:  
1. We believe that to be of practical value, performance targets have to be set 
within a wider framework of the organisation’s performance measurement 
system and the incentive system. 
2. We identified 10 common issues associated with the target setting process 
that undermined its effectiveness. 
3. We developed a comprehensive process for target setting – “The target 
setting wheel” 
4. We identified 3 factors that have an impact of the perception of target 
difficulty. 
 
We will briefly describe each of these in turn. 
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Targets, measures and incentives 
Much of the academic literature looks at target setting in isolation. We believe that 
to be of practical value, performance targets have to be set within a wider 
framework of the organisation’s performance measurement system and the incentive 
system. Figure A presents our framework that links the elements of target setting, 
performance measurement and incentives that need to be considered when 
developing an approach to influencing people’s behaviours. 
 
Figure A. The impact of incentives, measures and targets on behaviour 
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10 Common issues in target setting 
In our study of sales contexts we identified 10 common issues that undermined the 
effectiveness of targets. 
1. Their forecast was mainly based on past performance - so people don’t over 
achieve when it will make the next year’s target so much harder. 
2. Targets were allocated inappropriately across the sales force.  
3. Targets were perceived to be either too high or too low - too high de-motivates, 
leading to non-achievement - too low means paying bonus for poor performance. 
4. Some targets were based on the wrong performance measures - This was often 
referred to as “hitting the target and missing the point”.   
5. Targets were entirely based on financial indicators – even when factors such as 
customer relationships were absolutely critical.  
6. The data analysis process on which targets were based was poor and lacked 
rigour.  
7. Targets were not periodically reviewed – so were overtaken by events. 
8. Targets were “given” to the sales people – so not creating ownership. 
9. The interrelation between targets was not considered – causing inconsistency.  
10. Agreed action plans were the exception and not the norm.  
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A comprehensive 10 step target setting process 
Figure B. The target-setting wheel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Review stakeholder expectations - “what do they expect from this 
organisation?”  
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3. Define the organisation’s success map – the cause and effect relationship 
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KPIs.  
9. Action plan design - organisations need to spend time deciding on the actions 
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10. Action plan discussion and agreement - Targets must be communicated 
together with the action plan for delivering the targets. The action plan 
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targets.  
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Factors influencing perceived target difficulty 
Given the maxim “high but attainable”, it is important to understand the factors that 
influence perceived target difficulty. In this study of sales contexts we found that the 
following help people perceive their targets as being less difficult: - 
 
1. having a clear idea of what their role and performance expectations are; 
2. having a supportive organisation where risk-taking, continuous learning and 
improvement are encouraged; this promotes greater ownership of the targets, 
which in turn positively affects perceptions about how difficult these targets 
are; 
3. participating in the target-setting process. 
 
Interestingly, management’s view of role and performance clarity often differed 
from the sales force. Similarly, management often believed that the sales force had 
participated to some extent in the target setting process, whilst the sales people 
simply perceived that they had been given their targets, often with little explanation 
of how they were set, why they were important or how they were to be achieved. In 
this respect, communication is an extremely important factor in the whole process 
and can help overcome many of the difficulties that can arise when things don’t turn 
out the way they were expected to. 
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1. Introduction 
Performance targets are one of the most used managerial tools in the corporate 
world. Performance targets –also referred to as assigned goals, quotas or 
performance aspiration levels1
Quality management researchers and consultants such as Deming (1990) suggest 
that business goals are necessary for management (e.g. constancy of purpose and 
continuous improvement). However, performance targets established for 
employees without a road map have effects opposite to the effects sought. Deming 
(1990) stressed that performance targets are “a fortress against improvement” 
– can be defined as the objects or aims of 
managerial actions (Latham, 2004) or as borderlines that differentiate success 
from failure (Lopes, 1987). Performance targets are, for example, to attain a 10 
percent increase in sales or to improve customer satisfaction. Targets are mainly 
used for motivating specific behaviours, establishing expectations, evaluating and 
rewarding performance. At present, the use of performance targets seems to be 
ubiquitous; however, a high proportion of organisations have reported to be 
dissatisfied with their targets arguing that this management tool is not generating 
the expected results (Marchetti and Brewer, 2000).  
In research terms, several management fields have focused their attention on the 
nature and effects of performance targets. Organisational behaviour researchers, 
for example, have looked at the impact of assigned targets (i.e. targets set by 
superiors, also known as assigned goals) on performance for over 30 years. One of 
their main findings has been that people perform better when they are assigned 
specific and difficult targets than they do when they are assigned easy targets or 
“do your best” type of targets (Locke and Latham, 1990). This prediction has been 
proved to be so strong within the organisational behaviour literature that the use of 
performance targets is now regarded as an important aspect of motivation theory 
and management education (Ambrose and Kulik, 1999). Nevertheless, this area of 
research is far from being conclusive as there are numerous gaps that remain to be 
addressed. Furthermore, not all the management literature is in favour of the use 
of performance targets for managing employees’ performance. For instance, 
quality management research is very critical with the use of targets for motivation 
and performance management purposes (e.g. Deming, 1990).  
                                                 
 
1 It must be noted that the concepts of assigned goals, quotas and aspiration levels will be used 
interchangeably throughout this report. When the concept of performance targets is used it will 
always refers to targets that are assigned by superiors unless it says otherwise. The literature on 
self-assigned goals or targets is outside the scope of this research.  
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(p.71). Other quality management researchers argue that performance targets do 
not take into account the essential properties of the organisation as a system. This 
leads to detrimental results for the organisation in the long run, such as stressful 
work environments, low trust culture, data manipulation and financial 
performance losses (e.g. Gregory, 2007).  
In sum, a conflict exists between the different research schools that have studied 
performance targets as mechanisms for influencing behaviour and performance. 
This lack of consensus is a hurdle for managerial practice, as it does not provide 
clear guidance about what to expect from the use of this technique. One way 
forward proposed by some researchers is to stop questioning the validity of 
performance targets and to start searching for those environmental conditions 
under which the use of targets is effective and ineffective (Locke, 2004). Another 
way forward is to address the problems that we already know performance targets 
generate by integrating the insights extracted from different management 
literatures –for example, organisational behaviour and quality management 
(Carlson and Carlson, 1993) –; and by exploring performance targets using a 
wider focus than the one typically used. For instance, organisational behaviour 
research has mainly investigated performance targets as isolated elements 
affecting behaviour. Some studies have taken into consideration the linkage 
between performance targets and pay (e.g. Locke and Latham, 1990); but little 
work has focused on the intrinsic relationship between performance measures and 
targets, which is widely acknowledged as an important issues by performance 
measurement researcher (e.g. Johnston, Fitzgerald, Markou and Brignall, 2001; 
Manzoni, 2002; Otley, 1999). In fact, the effects of performance targets, measures 
and incentives should be considered in combination as all of them tend to be 
interrelated.  
Taking into account these suggestions for progressing the research on 
performance targets and for providing new insights to management professionals, 
this research aims to address three specific objectives. One objective is to 
investigate the behavioural effects of sales performance targets in relationship 
with sales forces’ incentive pay plans and sales performance measures. The sales 
function was chosen as it is known that in this environment performance targets 
are widely used (Alexander Group, 2004; Wotruba and Thurlow, 1976). A second 
objective is to examine the issues associated with target-setting processes and to 
define an improved procedure in which the knowledge of the different areas of 
target-setting research will be integrated. The third objective is to further 
understand the factors that affect how difficult a performance target is perceived 
to be as this perception seems to be the most critical driver of behaviour and 
performance (Atkinson, 1974; Locke and Latham, 1990; Vroom 1964;). In order 
to address these objectives, two different research methods have been employed. 
The first two objectives have been addressed using case study research. The third 
objective has been addressed using survey research. 
This report presents the results obtained in this study. It is structured as follows. 
Firstly, a brief review of the academic work previously conducted on the impact 
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of performance targets on behaviour is presented with a special emphasis on the 
studies that focus on sales professionals. Secondly, the report provides detailed 
information about how the Cranfield study has been developed. Thirdly, the 
insights extracted from the research are summarised. Finally, concluding remarks 
together with implications for managers and researchers are outlined.     
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2. What we know about target-setting and its 
impact on behaviour: a special emphasis on 
sales contexts 
The review of previous research on target setting and its impact on behaviour has 
been classified into five sections. The first section summarises the key predictions 
that different organisational theories suggest regarding the effects of performance 
targets. The second section reviews the empirical research that has examined the 
effects that performance targets have on behaviour with a special emphasis on 
research conducted in sales functions. The third section explores the literature on 
the linkage between performance targets and monetary incentives. The fourth 
section describes critical issues associated with performance measurement. The 
fifth section outlines what is known about optimal ways of setting performance 
targets in organisations. Finally, the sixth section looks at the set of factors that 
have been found to affect people’s perceptions on the level of difficulty of their 
targets. 
2.1. The impact of performance targets: Organisational 
theories  
Several organisational theories have looked at the effects of performance targets 
on behaviour and performance. There is a set of theories that look at targets as 
motivational tools and explain their effects from a psychological point of view, for 
example, Vroom’s (1964) expectancy-value theory; Atkinson’s (1957, 1974) 
achievement motivation theory; and Locke and Latham’s (1990) goal-setting 
theory. There are theories that study performance targets as decision-making tools 
as in the case of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory or Greve’s 
(2003) theory of learning from performance feedback. Finally, there are theories 
that investigate performance targets as interest-alignment mechanisms such as 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) and Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia’s (1998) behavioural agency theory. The key predictions about the 
impact of performance targets suggested by these theories are now briefly 
described.  
2.1.1. Motivation theories 
Three motivation theories have centred their attention on the effects of 
performance targets. These are the expectancy-value theory (Vroom, 1964), the 
achievement motivation theory (Atkinson, 1957, 1974), and the goal-setting 
theory (Locke and Latham, 1990).  
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Vroom’s (1964) expectancy-value theory suggests that the desirability of a reward 
and the individual’s estimate of how likely s/he will be to secure the reward 
constitute equally important motivators of actions (Walker, Churchill and Ford, 
1977). According to these suggestions, expectancy theory then predicts that if 
targets are set at a very high level they will diminish motivation and performance, 
as people will perceive a low probability of achieving them (see Figure 1 for an 
illustration).  
Figure 1. Expectancy theory predictions 
 
 
 
 
 
Atkinson’s (1957, 1974) achievement motivation theory proposes that individuals 
are motivated mainly by performance targets that are set at levels of intermediate 
difficulty –neither too high nor too low. Individual motivation (and performance) 
decreases as the perceived difficulty approaches the very easy (i.e. the individual 
is certain that s/he will achieve his/her target) or the impossible (i.e. the individual 
is certain that s/he will fail to achieve his/her target) (see Figure 2 for an 
illustration).  
Figure 2. Achievement motivation theory predictions  
 
 
 
 
 
Locke and Latham’s (1990) goal-setting theory, which is probably the most 
comprehensive and well researched theory of these three motivational theories, 
predicts that specific and difficult targets will enhance individual performance 
more than “do your best” type of targets (see Figure 3 for an illustration). 
According to goal-setting theory, “do your best” goals are too abstract and vague. 
They do not provide a clear external reference for evaluation and, thus, they allow 
Motivation/ 
Performance
Target difficulty
Target difficulty
Motivation/ 
Performance
The impact of performance targets on managerial behaviour            Page 17 
17 
for a wide range of performance levels that are acceptable to different people 
(Latham, 2004). 
Figure 3. Goal-setting theory predictions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is interesting to note the existing conflicts among these three theories. Some 
researchers have addressed this issue by looking at additional factors that may 
explain the contradictory results of the impact of performance target difficulty on 
motivation and performance. For example, Chowdhury (1993), suggests that the 
relationship between the level of target difficulty and motivation is influenced by 
a third variable, which is people’s impressions of their personal efficacy or sense 
of competence. Overall, it can be argued that there is still room for further 
research in this area as we are still not clear about the reasons why target difficulty 
can have these different effects on motivation and performance. Locke (2004) and 
Latham (2004) suggest that we should keep on searching for those contextual 
factors that affect the relationship between target difficulty and motivation in 
order to better understand this phenomenon.  
2.1.2. Decision-making theories 
As suggested earlier, two decision-making theories can be highlighted for their 
focus on understanding and explaining the effects of performance targets. These 
are prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and the theory of learning 
from performance feedback (Greve, 2003). It is important to say that these 
theories do not refer to performance targets explicitly. The central focus of their 
research is a reference point or an aspiration level, which is defined as the 
borderline that differentiate performance success from failure (Lopes, 1987). Due 
to their similarities, the concept of aspiration level can be compared to the concept 
of performance target at least in organisational contexts (Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). This comparison makes possible the application of decision-making 
research to target-setting research.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory aims to describe how decision 
makers decide on which action to take depending on how they perceive their 
performance to be. The theory suggests that when decision-makers believe they 
Target difficulty
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are in a sure gain context (i.e. their performance is above target), they will behave 
in a risk-averse way as they do not want to put at risk their gains. On the other 
hand, when decision-makers believe they are in a sure loss context (i.e. their 
performance is below target), they will be more willing to take risks as they could 
benefit from that behaviour by covering their loss.   
Greve’s (2003) theory of learning from performance feedback suggests that when 
performance is below target level, then problemistic search and risk-taking 
behaviours increase, which in turn generate greater organisational changes. The 
opposite will occur when performance is above target level. Problemistic search 
refers to the type of search that decision makers attempt based on their knowledge 
of how well they are performing. Greve (2003) argues that the direction of 
problemistic search depends on managerial judgement. As soon as decision 
makers find out that their performance is below target, the search for solutions 
will initially be in “the proximity of the current symptom” (e.g. searching for sales 
solutions to low sales performance). More complex solutions are likely to be 
sought once simple search solutions have failed (e.g. searching for product design 
solutions to low sales performance once sales solutions have been exhausted). 
Decision makers will evaluate potential solutions to performance problems and 
more risky alternatives will become more acceptable when performance is below 
target. Therefore, in general, organisational changes will be less likely to occur 
when performance is above target, since problemistic search will be at low levels; 
time dedicated to problem-solving will be less necessary; and managers will be 
more risk averse.  
In short, it can be argued that these two decision-making theories share the idea 
that performance targets can have two different effects depending on the level of 
performance obtained by an individual. If an individual’s performance is below 
target, this will positively affect his/her risk-taking behaviours. The opposite will 
occur if the individual’s performance is above target.   
2.1.3. Economic theories 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) and behavioural 
agency theory (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) have both explored the effects 
of performance targets when these are linked to incentive pay.  
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) describes the 
relationship between two parties: principals and agents. The principal’s main role 
consists of supplying capital, bearing risk, designing incentives and delegating 
work to agents. The agents’ main role is to work for the principal, which involves 
effort and decision-making responsibilities (Eisenhardt, 1989). In organisational 
research the relationship between principals and agents is normally used to 
describe the relationship between owners and managers; however, it can also be 
used to describe the relationship between managers and employees. Both parties 
are assumed to be fully rational, with well-defined preferences and motivated by 
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self-interest (i.e. willing to increase their own wealth with the minimal effort). 
Agents are assumed to be both effort-averse, and risk-averse (i.e. prefer to avoid 
both work and risk). Principals are considered to be risk-neutral (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Under these assumptions, agency theory proposes that the optimal way to 
align the interests of employees and managers (or managers and owners) is to 
establish incentive systems that are linked to individual, team and/or 
organisational performance measures and targets (Baiman, 1982, 1990). 
According to agency theorists, when incentives, performance measures and targets 
are used the agency problems are reduced and better organisational performance is 
achieved (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Behavioural agency theory (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) is an extension of 
agency theory that incorporates aspects of prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). It challenges the agents’ risk assumptions proposed by agency 
theory and states that agents’ risk preferences depend on contextual factors such 
as the design of incentive systems, the type of performance measures and targets 
used. In the case of targets, the behavioural agency theory argues that the level of 
target attainability used for determining incentive pay affects managers’ risk-
taking behaviours. High incentive-pay performance targets relative to individuals’ 
performance forecasts will make individuals perceive a loss context and this 
situation will increase their risk-taking behaviours. Similarly low incentive-pay 
performance targets relative to individuals’ performance forecasts will make 
individuals perceive a gain context and this situation will reduce their risk-taking 
behaviours. Therefore, this theory proposes that incentive-pay performance targets 
must be adjusted with performance to ensure that managers face loss decision 
contexts that will increase their tendency towards risk, as high managerial risk 
taking is considered to be associated with future increases on organisational 
performance (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
In sum, both theories promote the linkage between performance targets and pay. 
Agency theory suggests that this linkage will motivate the agent to behave in the 
direction that best suits the principal’s interests. Behavioural agency theory 
suggests that with this linkage agents’ risk taking behaviours can be encouraged. 
2.1.4. Summary  
Overall, these theories have something in common. They all stress the importance 
of how attainable people perceive their targets to be. Motivation theories suggest 
that when people perceive their target to be unattainable, this perception affects 
their motivation in different ways. It may increase it as proposed by goal-setting 
theory (Locke and Latham, 1990) or it may decrease it as proposed by expectancy 
theory (Vroom, 1964) and achievement motivation theory (Atkinson, 1974). 
Decision-making theories and behavioural agency theory suggest that when 
people perceive their target to be unattainable, this perception affects their risk-
taking behaviour by increasing it.  
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Now that the most important organisational theories have been reviewed, the 
discussion focuses on research that has empirically investigated the effects 
performance targets have on managerial behaviour with a special emphasis on 
those performance targets used in sales contexts.  
2.2. Exploring the different effects of performance targets 
on behaviour 
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted in order to examine the impact 
of assigned targets on people’s behaviour. The purpose of this section is to 
summarise this work. It has been structured as follows. Firstly, the insights 
extracted from sales management research are reviewed. Secondly, a summary of 
findings obtained from goal-setting theory studies is presented.  It is in this area of 
research where there has been more activity in looking at the effects of targets and 
the findings can easily be applied to sales environments. Thirdly, the literature 
from quality management researchers and practitioners is outlined as it challenges 
the use of performance targets altogether. As concluding remarks the findings 
from these literatures are discussed and key gaps that require further research are 
highlighted.  
2.2.1. Sales management research 
Research in sales management has found both positive and negative behavioural 
effects of the use of performance targets in sales environments. The sign of the 
effects is normally attributed to three factors: (1) target difficulty, which refers to 
the degree to which the goals assigned by a supervisor are attainable; (2) target 
specificity, defined as the extent to which the targets are clearly defined by a 
supervisor; and (3) target participation, which is the degree of involvement sales 
people have in the target setting process (Locke and Latham, 1990).  
Taking into consideration these three factors, most studies look at the effects of 
sales performance targets on behavioural variables such as: motivation and effort 
(e.g. Chowdhury, 1993; Fang, Palmatier and Evans, 2004; Winer, 1973; Wotruba, 
1989); ethical behaviour (e.g. Schwepker and Good, 1999); or risk taking 
behaviour (e.g. Gaba and Kaira, 1999). A summary of the studies looking at the 
impact of performance targets is presented in Appendix A. From this body of 
research the following insights can be extracted:  
 The degree of target difficulty that is required in order to generate positive 
effects on effort seems unclear. This issue reflects the inconsistencies 
highlighted earlier in Vroom’s (1964), Atkinson’s (1974) and Locke and 
Latham’s (1990) theories. Some authors suggest that targets need to be 
difficult in order to increase effort (e.g. Winer, 1973); whereas, other authors 
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stress that performance targets need to be moderately difficult in order to 
increase effort (e.g. Schwepker and Good, 2004). 
 The work of Chowdhury (1993) has tried to address the inconsistencies 
around the optimal level of target difficulty by looking at contextual factors 
that may moderate the impact of targets. He finds that sales people with high 
self-efficacy may respond positively to highly difficult targets, whereas sales 
people with low-self-efficacy will respond negatively to highly difficult 
targets.  
 Fang, Evans and Zou (2005) look at another set of contextual variables and 
find that the effects of target difficulty and specificity depend on the type of 
strategic goals that the company wants to emphasise (outcome performance 
vs. behavioural performance). When outcome performance targets (i.e. sales 
volumes, profits) are the key drivers of a business; then the use of targets that 
are moderately difficult and specific seems more effective in terms of 
individual performance. When behavioural performance (i.e. maintaining 
good relationships with customers, providing timely feedback) is the primary 
concern of managers; then more easily attainable and non-specific targets 
(e.g., do your best) seem more desirable. These findings were obtained in an 
Anglo-Saxon culture (US); however, they might not hold in other cultures. 
 Even though the use of specific targets may positively affect effort (i.e. 
working harder), this effect might not influence individual performance results 
in direct selling contexts (Wotruba, 1989).  
 Participation in target-setting processes increases the accuracy of sales 
forecasts (Wotruba & Thurlow, 1976). 
 Giving information to sales people about how well they are performing 
against their targets influences their perception of the level of difficulty of the 
target. Their perception about their targets difficulty subsequently affects their 
motivation and willingness to exert effort (Chowdhury, 1993). 
 Failing to meet a performance target may produce emotional reactions that 
may negatively affect motivation (Badovick, 1990) and generate unethical 
behaviours from sales people (Schwepker and Good, 1999).  
 The impact of performance targets on sales people risk taking behaviour is 
unclear. There is research suggesting that when sales people perceive that they 
are not going to achieve their targets, which will affect their bonus; this 
situation will induce sales people to opt for high-risk sales prospects (Gaba 
and Kaira, 1999). However, there is also research suggesting that under those 
circumstances, sales people will become more risk-averse (Ross and William, 
1991). 
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 When sales people fail to meet their performance targets and sales managers 
take no actions, performance tends to be lower. On the other hand, managers 
who work with or coach “no-quota achievers” create better performance. 
Furthermore, the less leniency sales people are afforded in reaching their 
targets prior to being terminated, the higher their performance and their 
income (Schwepker and Good, 2004). 
2.2.2. Goal-setting theory research  
In addition to the insights extracted from the sales management literature, there 
are some general findings from the goal-setting theory literature that can also be 
applied to sales contexts. For example, Latham (2004) outlines the conditions 
under which the use of performance targets may generate unintended 
consequences. He also highlights the downsides and risks of using performance 
targets.  
2.2.2.1. When targets may generate unintended consequences 
Based on his research and that of his colleagues, Latham (2004) suggests that for 
specific and challenging targets to be effective the following conditions must exist 
(see bullet points below). If these conditions are not there, targets may generate 
unintended consequences.  
 Employees have control over the actions associated with their performance 
targets. 
 Employees have the ability and knowledge to attain their targets. If they do 
not have the ability and knowledge to attain their targets, learning targets or 
“do your best” type of targets can be used instead of specific outcome targets. 
 Employees are committed to attain their targets, especially if their targets are 
difficult. 
 Employees receive feedback on their progress towards targets. 
 Employees performing low-complexity tasks that do not require strategy or 
behavioural routines to be acquired need less involvement in target setting. 
When complex task are perform then participation in the target setting process 
is advised. In Latham’s (2004) words: “When working smarter rather than 
harder, when one’s knowledge rather than one’s effort (motivation) is required 
[for dealing with complex tasks], participation in target-setting leads to higher 
performance if it increases the probability of finding an appropriate strategy 
for performing the task, and if it increases the confidence of people that the 
strategy can be implemented effectively” (p.128). 
 Employees have the resources needed to attain their targets. 
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 Employees have superiors that take the steps required for removing obstacles 
that may be in the way for attaining their performance targets. 
2.2.2.2. Downsides and risks of using performance targets 
There are also a clear set of downsides and risks of using performance targets that 
the goal-setting theory literature highlights (Latham, 2004). These are: 
 When targets are set for any single dimension of performance, other 
dimensions will be sacrificed and trade-offs will occur. For example, quantity 
performance targets must be balanced with quality targets. If not, people may 
try too hard for quantity at the expense of quality or vice versa. 
 Individual targets must be balanced with team or group targets if the tasks of 
individuals are interrelated. If only individual performance targets are used 
when teamwork is important; then those who are highly committed to their 
targets may not help others to attain their targets.  
 When there are two or more performance targets, targets conflict may occur 
and performance on all targets may suffer. In these situations, targets should 
have a specific weight that gives signals to employees about business 
priorities. 
 Very difficult targets over an extended time period, without sufficient time 
periods among them, can lead to exhaustion. 
 Unethical behaviours can occur if employees are force to attain very difficult 
targets in punitive environments where target failure is severely judged. On 
the other hand, if failing to meet a target is seen as a transitory part of a 
learning process (specially in high-innovation firms), then employees will be 
more willing to take risks setting challenging targets that will ultimately 
enhance performance. 
2.2.3. Quality management research and practice 
The work of quality management consultants and researchers such as Deming 
(1990) seriously challenges previous studies on the impact of performance targets. 
According to this work, the use of performance targets based on un-scientific 
methods and without a road map brings losses to organisational performance. 
Furthermore, the linkage between targets and incentives is the driver of 
unintended consequences that will negatively affect performance in the long-term. 
Instead of using this type of motivation mechanism, quality management authors 
suggest that good leadership –as opposed to merely supervision or monitoring– 
should be the main driver of performance in the short-tern and in the long-term.  
In particular, Deming (1990) argues that an organisation can attain almost any 
goal in the short-term but this achievement may compromise its performance in 
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the long run (e.g. it is easy for a firm that is underperforming to show a profit if it 
sells off its healthiest operations; however, this action will probably make the 
situation worse in the long-term). Deming maintains that performance targets 
negatively affect continuous improvement and that they diminish the level of trust 
in management.  
Despite these criticisms, it is important to note that numerous studies (e.g. more 
than 500 studies in goal setting theory over more than 30 years) have shown that, 
under specific circumstances, performance targets increase the performance of 
organisations. Therefore, as suggested earlier in the text, many authors (e.g. 
Carson and Carson, 1993) argue that the work of Deming should be 
complemented with further research on those issues associated with performance 
targets instead of recommending the abandonment of this managerial tool 
altogether.  
2.2.4. Remarks about the literature  
The literature on the impact of sales performance targets is extensive, but it has 
clear gaps that need to be addressed. One of these gaps is the relationship between 
performance measures, incentive pay and targets. Most of the literature focuses on 
the impact of targets assuming that those targets are based on the right 
performance measures and on the right incentive plans. However, it is well known 
in the management literature that if the performance measures or the incentive 
schemes are not appropriate; then, the effects on behaviour and performance 
might not be as expected regardless of how appropriate the targets might be (e.g. 
Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2006; Neely, Adams and Kennerley, 
2002). In the case of sales contexts, this narrow focus on targets can be 
particularly dysfunctional.  
Sales environments are currently experiencing great transformations (e.g. the 
complexity of sales roles is increasing, team selling is now a critical sales 
capability as well as relationship selling, and customers are becoming more and 
more demanding) (Brown, Evans, Mantrala and Challagalla, 2005). Most of these 
transformations are not being reflected in the type of performance measures and 
rewards that managers use to motivate their sales people. Most sales performance 
measurement and incentive systems still focus on the maximisation of product 
sales to meet short-term sales targets, and they assume that sales people are still 
“lone wolves” working autonomously in their own territories (Brown et al, 2005). 
The reality is somehow different. At present, most sales people work in teams 
where customer information must be produced and shared. Their roles are 
increasingly complex with goals that are not only to maximise product sales from 
a list of assigned customers but also to engage in profitable and satisfactory 
relationships with existing customers and to identify, attract and acquire new 
customers with high lifetime value (Brown et al., 2005). This new selling 
environment requires innovative ways of measuring performance, setting targets 
and designing incentive plans, which effects are still far from being understood. 
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Another gap in the literature is the examination of how the target-setting system 
and its implementation affect sales people’s behaviour and ultimate performance. 
At the moment, the only aspect being researched in the literature is the level of 
participation of sales people in the process of setting targets. However, there are 
many other variables that play a role in the process of setting and implementing 
performance targets. These include the targets communication process; the type of 
factors taken into consideration in the target-setting process (past performance 
only, environmental factors, etc.); the level of understanding of the targets by the 
sales people; the degree of action planning before and after targets are set; 
stability of performance targets. 
A third gap in this area of research is the need to further understand the different 
factors that affect people’s perceptions about how difficult their targets are. As 
reviewed earlier, there are conflicting results about the most appropriate level of 
target difficulty. Some studies suggest that better performance is achieved with 
highly difficult targets (Locke and Latham, 1990); whereas, other studies argue 
that better performance is achieved with targets that are moderately difficult 
(Atkinson, 1974). It is important to note that no two people are likely to share the 
same perceptions about how difficult their targets are. In practical terms, how can 
management know if the targets they set are highly difficult or moderately 
difficult if perceptions about the level of target difficulty remain in the eyes of the 
beholder? One way of addressing this problem is by taking into consideration that 
people’s perceptions about the level of difficulty of their targets can be influenced 
by numerous factors (e.g. self-efficacy, performance feedback) (e.g. Chowdhury, 
1993). Some of these factors can be controlled by management. 
The present study aims to shed some light into these gaps in the literature. For that 
reason, the following sections look in more detail at: (1) the different methods for 
linking performance targets to incentives and the issues associated with the 
measurement of performance; (2) the process of setting performance targets; and 
(3) the factors that may affect people’s perceptions about the level of difficulty of 
their targets; 
2.3. Linking performance targets to incentive pay 
Performance targets can be used alone or they can be linked to incentive plans as 
agency theory suggests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). In sales 
environments, performance targets are typically linked to incentive pay (Sands, 
2000). According to the literature, there are a number of ways in which 
performance targets can be linked to incentive compensation and each way has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Management selects the different structures that 
target-based incentive plans take depending on situational characteristics such as: 
the strategic business objectives, specific constraints (e.g. sales people’s equity 
perceptions, sales people’s earnings security), available information (e.g. on 
territory sales, sales people’s risk preferences) and ability to predict future results, 
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sales management culture and philosophy (Darmon, 1997; Zoltners, Sinha and 
Lorimer, 2006).  
The different ways in which performance targets can be linked to pay are 
described here by reviewing the following design options (Darmon, 1997; Locke, 
2004; Sands, 2000; Zoltners et al., 2006). Firstly, the achievement of performance 
targets can be linked to bonus plans, commission plans or both. Secondly, the 
achievement of performance targets can be associated with a single payment level, 
with multiple payment levels or it can be linked to monetary rewards using a 
linear relationship. Thirdly, payments for the achievement of performance targets 
can be subject to an upper level limit, a threshold, or both. Finally, performance 
targets can be set for a sales person and the associated rewards can be given not 
only based on how well the person achieved the targets –as all the previous design 
decisions assume–, but also on an evaluation of the circumstances under which the 
sales person achieved his/her targets. These options are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive as they all tend to be combined in practice. Each of these five design 
options is described as follows. 
2.3.1. Type of incentive plan: Bonuses and commissions 
One key decision that must be taken when establishing a linkage between sales 
performance targets and incentives is whether the payments are going to take the 
form of bonuses, commissions or a mix of the two (Zoltners et al, 2006). With a 
bonus plan, each sales person tends to be given a performance target or quota for 
his territory, and payments begin when the person reaches his or her target or a 
specific portion of that target (Zoltners et al, 2006). For example, the performance 
target of a sales person can be to achieve a 10% increase in sales profits of 
territory A compared to last year’s profits. If that target is achieved; then, the 
person receives a bonus. A bonus is a compensation element that is added to the 
fixed salary that the sales person receives. Bonuses can be calculated as a 
percentage of the sales person’s fixed salary or as an absolute monetary value.  
Commission plans can also be linked to performance targets but their structure is 
different from the structure of bonus plans. In a commission plan a commission 
rate is specified for performance above a specific target and this rate is multiplied 
by the number achieved in the performance measures evaluated, e.g. sales or 
profit (Zoltners et al. 2006). In the past, it was common to find organisations that 
had sales people on commission only, with no additional fixed salary. This type of 
compensation scheme was found to be dysfunctional for organisations and at 
present is very rare to find firms using it (Litzky, Eddleston, Kidder, 2006). A 
common feature of commission-based incentive plans is a fixed salary component 
that is smaller than the salary component of bonus-based incentive plans (Zoltners 
et al. 2006). 
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2.3.2. All or nothing, multiple payment levels and linear 
relationships 
The achievement of performance targets can be linked to a single payment, to 
multiple payments or it can also be linked to pay based on a linear relationship 
(Locke, 2004). The first option consists of linking a single performance target to a 
monetary reward (usually a bonus calculated as a percentage of salary) if it is 
attained and to no monetary reward if it is missed. Figure 6 shows a bonus 
example of this first option. This method strongly motivates sales people to reach 
the target since a portion of their total compensation is at risk. However, this 
method may be the trigger of unethical behaviour (e.g. low quality of 
relationships, high risk-taking, data manipulation) as sales people will be likely to 
do what it takes to get their bonus. Another disadvantage of this method is that it 
might be considered unfair and demoralising by those individuals whose results 
are very close to the target but not exactly on target. This type of method may be 
optimal for environments where ethical norms and standards are clearly 
communicated and consistently enforced; and where performance targets are easy 
to set (i.e. forecasting tends to be accurate).  
Figure 4. Example of an “all or nothing” type of linkage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second option consists on linking multiple levels of a performance target to 
multiple payment levels (these payment levels can be determined using bonuses or 
different commission rates). This method establishes that the higher the target 
level attained, the higher the monetary reward received. Figure 7 shows a bonus 
example following this method. On the one hand, with this type of linkage there is 
less temptation for sales people to cause unethical behaviours as their different 
levels of achievement will be rewarded. On the other hand, since the different 
levels of achievement are rewarded, sales people may be less motivated to try for 
the target with the highest level. This method normally includes a minimum 
Salary
£5,000 Bonus
Payout
% Target Achieved
Example: A sales person is paid a salary plus a bonus 
of 10% of his/her salary upon target achievement.
100%
£50,000
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threshold below which performance is considered inadequate and no payment is 
provided.  
Figure 5. Example of a step linkage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third option for linking a performance target with pay consists of the use of a 
mathematical linear function that relates the different levels of target achievement 
with the different monetary rewards. In this method, the sales person gets paid 
exactly for what s/he achieves. An example of this method is provided in Figure 8. 
This type of linkage further decreases the temptation to cause unethical 
behaviours and does not affect motivation for reaching higher levels of 
performance. However, this way of associating performance targets with 
compensation may be costly for organisations as no payment limits are 
established.  
Figure 6. Example of a linear relationship 
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£3,000 Bonus
Payout
% Target Achieved
Example: A sales person is paid a salary plus multiple 
bonuses when several target thresholds are achieved: 
• £3,000 bonus at 90% of target
• £10,000 bonus at 100% of target
• £1,000 bonus for each 1% above target
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£50,000
£10,000 Bonus
£1,000 bonus for every 
1% over target
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Salary
Bonus (Y) = 1,000 X
Payout
% Target Achieved
Example: A sales person is paid a salary plus a bonus calculated using the 
formula: Y = 1,000 X. In this formula “Y” is the bonus and “X” is the % of 
above target achievement. Thus if the sales person achieves 110% of the 
target, then the s/he will received a bonus of £10,000.
100%
£50,000
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Zoltners, et al. (2006) extend this third method by suggesting that apart from 
using a linear function for linking a target with a bonus, another three types of 
functions are normally used in combination with linear functions. These are 
progressive functions, regressive functions and mixed functions. A progressive 
function pays a higher bonus as the percentage of target achievement increases. A 
regressive function pays a lower bonus as the percentage of target achievement 
increases. A mixed function combines both higher and lower bonuses as the level 
of target achievement increases. These functions are represented in Figure 9. 
Figure 7. Regressive, progressive and mixed relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.3. The use of thresholds and caps 
The relationship between performance targets and pay can be subject to the 
achievement of a specific threshold, under which performance is considered to be 
unacceptable. This threshold can be established at 100% of target achieved or at a 
lower percentage of target achieved (e.g. 90%). A threshold is always used with 
bonus plans. In the case of commission plans, sales people can start getting paid 
from “the first pound” sold. Industries that tend to use commission plans that pay 
from the first pound are, for example, insurance, stockbrokerage and real state 
(Zoltners, et al, 2006). The relationship between performance targets and 
incentives can also have an upper level limit, commonly known as a cap, which 
limits the amount of money that a sales person can earn in a single period or for a 
single performance target. Caps can be expressed as certain pound amount, as a 
percentage of base pay, or as a percentage of target achieved. The use of caps can 
have serious effects on sales people motivation and they can cause unethical 
behaviours such as holding sales over to the next target period (Zoltners, et al., 
2006). 
2.3.4. Before the fact or after the fact linkage 
Finally, a performance target can be linked to pay before the fact or after the fact 
(Locke, 2004). Before the fact refers to performance targets that are set and linked 
to a specific amount of money before a sales person takes any action towards 
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achieving those targets. All the different design options reviewed in previous 
sections are linkages that occur before the fact. A linkage that occurs after the fact 
refers to a monetary reward that is decided after the sales person has taken all 
his/her actions towards the achievement of a target. In this case, the results of 
his/her performance are evaluated taking into consideration the full context in 
which the target has been pursued. This method is considered to be more flexible 
and comprehensive. However, it may be very time consuming for management 
and to a certain extent subjective since reward decisions are based on management 
judgement. 
2.4. The relationship between targets and performance 
measures 
Performance targets are intrinsically related to performance measures. Assuming 
that performance targets are set appropriately, performance measures need to be 
the “right” ones –i.e. they should be measures that adequately identify and assess 
the drivers of business success– in order to generate the expected behaviours. As 
suggested earlier, researchers have mainly investigated the impact of performance 
targets on behaviour without questioning the validity of the performance measures 
associated with targets (see for example Schwepker and Good, 2004; Winer, 
1973; Wotruba, 1989), which is a clear gap in the literature. A variety of measures 
can be used to assess the performance of a sales function; however, not all of them 
are appropriate for target-setting and incentive purposes (Zoltners, et al. 2006).  
Before going into the type of performance measures that can be adequate for 
target-setting and incentive purposes, let us focus on some issues that are generic 
to all performance measures.  
2.4.1. Common issues associated with performance measures 
As suggested by Franco-Santos (forthcoming), it is commonly assumed that when 
performance measures are used, efforts and resources are more rationally 
managed and, as a result, organisational success is more likely to occur. However, 
a number of issues associated with performance measurement affect the validity 
of this assumption. These are: 
 The illusion that performance measures can be perfect representations of 
managerial performance. Managerial performance has multiple dimensions, 
some of which are not observable (Feltham & Xie, 1994). When selecting 
performance measures, the focus can only be on those dimensions that are 
observable, which means that there are dimensions of managerial performance 
that are left unmeasured. In addition to this, there is a cost associated with the 
design and implementation of performance measures. Those measures that are 
considered costly will tend to be avoided. As a result, the performance 
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measures that are finally used in organisations are imperfect representations of 
the complex actions that generate managerial performance. The problem 
occurs when organisations consider these imperfect performance measures as 
true managerial performance.  
 The use of the same performance measures for different purposes. 
Organisations tend to use the same performance measures for both 
informational and motivational purposes. When used for informational 
purposes, performance measures provide insights that facilitate decision-
making and generate improvements (e.g. in reporting and process 
improvement). When used for motivational or control purposes, performance 
measures affect the behaviour of those employees that are being measured 
(e.g. in incentive plans). These two measurement roles are not always 
compatible (Austin, 1996). Research has found that the more performance 
measures are used for control purposes the more subject they are to corruption 
pressures and the more apt these measures are to distort and corrupt the 
performance they are intended to monitor (Campbell, 1979). If performance 
measures used for control purposes are distorted their use for decision-making 
or improvement becomes an issue (i.e. little can be learned from data that has 
been previously manipulated).  
 Correlation issues when multiple measures are used. Many organisations are 
now using multiple measures for evaluating and rewarding their employees’ 
performance. It may occur that some of these measures are negatively 
correlated. If that is the case (e.g. innovation measures tend to be negatively 
correlated with profits in the same incentive period), employees may feel 
demoralised, as they cannot succeed in both measures at the same time. In this 
situation, there is a inbuilt problem in the measurement system and the 
performance evaluation results do not really reflect the employees’ true 
performance. The consequence may be that employees are tempted to exhibit 
unethical behaviours such as “window dressing” or “performance padding” 
(Meyer and Gupta, 1994).  
 The diminish variance of performance measures. Over time, performance 
measures lose variability and the ability to discriminate between good and bad 
performance. This loss in variability can be caused by four different factors 
(Meyer and Gupta, 1994): positive learning, perverse learning, selection or 
suppression. It can be due to positive learning as people learn how to improve 
their performance in whatever they are being measured on. It can be due to 
perverse learning or gaming as people learn how to increase the results of a 
measure without improving the performance that is sought. It can be due to 
selection as organisations learn either positively or perversely and decide to 
replace low performers with high performers. Finally, it can be due to 
suppression of performance measures, which occurs when performance 
differences cannot be diminished by either improvement, the appearance of 
improvement, or selection. What this shows is that the usefulness of a 
performance measure decays over time.  
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Besides these drawbacks of performance measures, organisations rely on them 
hugely for monitoring their success and for rewarding their employees (Neely, 
2002). However as suggested earlier, not all performance measures are 
appropriate for compensation and target-setting purposes. In the following two 
sections; firstly, the type of performance measures that tend to be linked to 
compensation and targets are reviewed; secondly, the key factors that affect the 
effectiveness of performance measures is reviewed.  
2.4.2. Behavioural-based versus outcome-based measures 
Some authors have clearly distinguished between two types of measures that are 
used in sales contexts (e.g. Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Cravens, Ingram, 
LaForge, and Young, 1993; Eisenhardt, 1985): behaviour-based and outcome-
based measures. At present, most organisations use both types of measures in 
order to influence behaviour and performance (Zoltners, et al., 2006). Behaviour-
based measures have low measurability and are oriented towards the longer term 
as. their effects may not be fully realised until several years have past. These 
characteristics make them less appropriate for target-setting purposes as specific 
and accurate targets are difficult to estimate. Examples of behaviour-based 
measures are: sales force product knowledge, relationship management and 
selling skills. Behavioural-based measures require high levels of managerial 
monitoring and tend to be linked to fixed salary compensation. Outcome-based 
measures have high measurability and are oriented towards the short-term as their 
impact can be fully realised during the incentive period. Some examples of these 
measures are: sales revenues, profits, market share and sales growth from existing 
customers. Outcome-based measures require lower levels of managerial 
monitoring, are more appropriate for target-setting purposes and are linked to 
incentive compensation.  
2.4.3. Factors that affect the effectiveness of a performance 
measure 
The selection of the most appropriate performance measures for compensation 
purposes is a critical decision managers must make. As mentioned earlier if a 
compensation system is based on the wrong measures unexpected behaviours may 
occur, which might be detrimental for organisational performance. There is an 
extensive body of research that has looked at the key factors that influence the 
effectiveness of performance measures. Some of these factors apply to the 
measures themselves –that is the case of the level of performance measures 
informativeness, controllability, objectivity, alignment, agreement, clarity, 
validity, reliability and fairness. Others apply to the complete set of performance 
measures that is used to determine pay –that is the case of performance measures 
quantity and completeness. All these factors are reviewed as follows. 
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 Performance Measures’ Informativeness. According to agency theorists, the 
most important aspect to take into account when selecting measures of 
performance for reward purposes is the informativeness principle (Holmstrom, 
1979). This principle states that a measure might be linked to pay if it provides 
information about the dimensions of managerial action that the manager (or 
owner) wishes to motivate (Indjejikian, 1999; Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 
1997).  
 Performance Measures’ Controllability. Agency theorists have also suggested 
what is known as the controllability principle (e.g. Demski & Feltham, 1978). 
This principle suggests that an individual should be evaluated and rewarded 
by a performance measure, if he or she can control or significantly influence 
that measure (Indjejikian, 1999).  
 Performance Measures’ Congruence or alignment. Another aspect that has 
been examined by agency theory is the importance of performance measures’ 
congruence or alignment. Compensation schemes are designed to align 
employees’ interests with managers’ interest (also managers’ interest with 
owners’ interests). In practical terms, this means that the performance 
measures used for determining pay should be the ones that encourage the type 
of behaviours that are required to achieve the organisation’s strategic 
objectives. In his work, Kerr (1995) presents numerous examples where the 
importance of performance measures alignment has not been taken into 
consideration and how this problem has resulted in unexpected consequences. 
 Performance measures objectivity. Research suggests that the use of 
subjective performance measures is associated with performance evaluation 
bias; as a result, for compensation purposes the use of objective performance 
measures is recommended (e.g. Ittner, Larcker, and Meyer, 2003; Moers, 
2005; Prendergast, and Topel, 1993). However, some authors have found that 
subjective performance measures are appropriate for complementing objective 
measures, even though in order to be perceived as effective they need to be 
employed in an organisational context where there are high levels of trust 
between managers and employees (e.g. Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede and 
Vargus, 2004). 
 Performance measures agreement. It is critical that management defines and 
designs performance measures that are relevant for the user. For that reason, it 
is important that the user agrees a performance measure before it is linked to 
his/her incentive plan (Manoochehri, 1999). 
 Performance measures reliability. This characteristic refers to the extent to 
which a performance measure is repeatable (e.g. whether two observers would 
observe the same values at the same time) and its data is error-free and 
unbiased (Busby and Williamson, 2000). 
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 Performance measures clarity and communication. If performance measures 
are to be use effectively, users need to clearly understand them. Before linking 
any new performance measures to an incentive system, the user has to be 
educated to understand: What is the new measure? What does it measure? 
Why is it needed? How does the measure impact him/her? How do his/her 
decisions and actions impact the new performance measure? How can s/he 
control the performance and the outcome? The user's knowledge should not be 
taken for granted (Manoochehri, 1999). 
 Performance measures review. In order to keep the performance measures 
relevant and effective, they should be reviewed periodically. Performance 
measures should evolve to reflect the changes and organisation goes through 
(e.g. strategic changes, changes in structure, changes in technology, etc.) 
(Bourne, Neely, Mills, Platts, Wilcox, 2000; Kennerley and Neely, 2002). 
 Performance measures fairness. Performance measures must be perceived as 
fair by their users. In some context the same performance measure may favour 
some people and not others. This issue should be avoided if the right 
behaviours are to be encouraged.   
 Performance measures quantity. Performance measurement research has 
found that the number of measures included in a compensation system should 
be kept to a minimum (e.g. Meyer and Gupta, 1994). The work of Miller 
(1956) tends to be used to prescribe that the most appropriate number of 
measures to use for compensation purposes should be five plus/minus two 
(e.g. Simons, 2000). This is because individuals can remember, recall, and 
work creatively with seven bits of information. With 10 or more bits of 
information, individuals suffer from information overload. Moreover, if 
people are asked to do too many things concurrently, no single initiative will 
receive enough attention to assure success (Miller, 1956). 
 Performance measures completeness and validity. This characteristic can be 
described using two different perspectives. From the point of view of a single 
performance measure, this characteristic refers to the extent to which a 
performance measure represents the construct of interest (Busby and 
Williamson, 2000). However, this characteristic can also apply to the set of 
performance measures that aim to assess managerial performance. From that 
point of view, this characteristic refers to the extent to which the set of 
performance measures is able to capture the different dimensions of 
managerial performance (Austin, 1996).  
Having reviewed the factors that affect the effectiveness of performance 
measures, the next section examines the issues associated with the target-setting 
process.. 
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2.5. Issues associated with target-setting processes 
There is limited research looking at the specific issues associated with the process 
of setting targets (Kaplan and Norton, 2001). In this section, we summarise the 
work that, to our knowledge exists in this particular area. The section is structured 
as follows. Firstly, the research conducted in sales environments is presented. 
Secondly, the insights extracted from decision making research are highlighted. 
Finally, typical issues associated with establishing targets obtained from public 
sector and economic research sources are outlined. 
2.5.1. Setting targets in sales environments 
Developing a target-based reward plan is a complex and challenging management 
task. For instance, Darmon (1997) suggests that in order to set proper quotas and 
rewards, management needs to secure, collect and process critical information 
(e.g. sales people’s territories sales response functions, sales people’s risk-taking 
preferences) that involves substantial costs (see Table 1). Because of the costs 
involved, it is important that the benefits obtained from using target-based reward 
systems exceed the costs of developing them. As it has been mentioned in 
previous sections, the development of a target-based reward system comprises 
three key elements: an incentive plan structure, a set of measures used to assess 
performance and a set of targets that establish the level of the performance 
measure that is considered successful. The first two elements have already been 
explored. Let’s now focus on the process typically used for setting performance 
targets.  
Table 1. Costs associated with setting targets in sales functions (adapted from Darmon, 2001) 
Type of cost Cost 
Fixed costs (over a 
target period) 
 Costs of the managerial and administrative time spent devising the structure of 
the target-based reward plan. 
  Costs of setting up support for administering the plan (computer time, 
software development, clerical work, etc.). 
  Non-variable costs for collecting the data for setting up the target-based 
reward plan. 
  Costs for processing the data for determining targets and rewards. 
  Costs of management and sales people’s time for pre-testing the plan. 
  Costs of management and sales people’s time for revising the plan.  
  Costs of the managerial time for communicating and explaining the plan to the 
sales force. 
  Costs for evaluating the target-based reward plan structure performance. 
Variable costs 
(according to sales 
force size) 
 Costs of sales people’s time for providing the data that will be used for target-
setting. 
  Costs of sales people’s time for having the plan explained and for learning it. 
  Costs of managerial and sales people’s time spent discussing and negotiating 
target issues. 
  Costs of managerial and sales people’s time spent for following up target 
results.  
  Costs of managerial time spent providing feedback on target results. 
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Type of cost Cost 
  Costs of managerial and administrative time for implementing the target-based 
reward plan and for controlling its performance. 
  Opportunity costs of possible misperceptions of the target-based reward plan 
by some sales people. 
 
There is a dearth of information in the academic sales and marketing literature on 
the details of the process of target setting. Most of the work conducted in the area 
only takes into consideration the level of participation of sales people in the 
process of setting targets (e.g. Wotruba and Thurlow, 1976). Based on anecdotal 
evidence from the literature and our own experience of practice, however, it can 
be argued that targets are set normally following the process described in Table 3.  
Table 2. Typical target-setting process (for one target period) 
Steps Description 
Step 1  Based on the strategic objectives that the organisation wants to achieve in the area of 
sales several performance measures are selected (note: these measures rarely change 
from year to year) and these measures are linked to pay following a specific 
structure.  
Step 2  Data is collected regarding the performance measures selected and feedback on 
issues associated with the performance measures is also obtained from sales people.  
Step 3  Data is processed and analysed in order to calculate performance measures results. 
Step 4  Forecasting analysis take place and a forecast value for each performance measure is 
obtained. 
Step 5  Based on the forecast value obtained for each performance measure a performance 
target is established and communicated to management. 
Step 6  Managers discuss the selected targets with their sales people in order to reach an 
agreement. In some organisations, this step is avoided by management and 
performance targets are just given to sales people without previous negotiation and 
agreement. 
 
Due to the scarcity of sales and marketing research looking at the specific process 
that companies follow for setting sales people’s performance targets, we turn our 
focus to work conducted by decision-making researchers on establishing 
performance aspiration levels.  
2.5.2. Setting targets: Insights from decision-making research  
As stated previously, decision-making research does not mention the concept of 
performance targets explicitly. Research in this area uses the term reference point 
or aspiration level. An Aspiration level has been defined as “the level of future 
performance in a familiar task which an individual […] explicitly undertakes to 
reach” (Frank, 1935) or “the borderline between perceived success and failure and 
the starting point of doubt and conflict in decision making” (Greve, 2003, p. 39, 
based on the Lopes, 1987). An aspiration level in a managerial context can be 
considered a similar concept to the one of a performance target as a performance 
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target is one of the reference points managers use to differentiate good from bad 
performance.  
2.5.2.1. Historical and social performance targets 
According to Greve (2003) the most typical aspiration levels are generated in two 
ways. These are historical and social aspiration levels or targets.  
Historical targets are based on past performance information. “Past performance 
is an indicator of how well the organisation can perform and can easily become a 
standard for how well the organisation should perform” (Greve, 2003, p. 42”. 
Historical targets rely on internal information generated by the organisation, 
which makes them easier to understand by management. They are generated based 
on past performance plus or minus a specific percentage which is decided based 
on new organisational information (e.g. an increase in potential customers, 
problems in the production line, etc.). They are most useful when external sources 
of information are unavailable, unreliable or perceived as irrelevant. They have 
good forecasting properties when the organisation operates in environments where 
uncertainty is low (i.e. the performance of past years will not be severely affected 
by environmental changes). However, one key drawback is that these targets can 
cause managers to be content with performance that over time is lower than that 
of comparable organisations.  
Social targets are generated using information on other organisations that are 
viewed as comparable to the focal organisation (Greve, 2003). They require 
management to choose a suitable reference group and to observe and collect 
information on the performance of that reference group. These types of targets are 
most useful when organisations operate in environments where uncertainty is high 
and past performance is not reliable for predicting future performance. One good 
example of this is the oil industry, where performance is highly affected by oil 
price movements. The main weaknesses of social targets are that they are unable 
to account for specific differences in capabilities or niches that the organisations 
being compared might have; and that the information they are based on might not 
always be reliable and valid as management has little control over it (Greve, 
2003).  
Regarding management preferences for either historical or social targets, research 
has found that this preference depends on the following factors: (1) the level of 
management business experience and tenure (i.e. the more management 
experience and tenure, the less management makes use of social information); (2) 
the maturity of the organisation and the type of environment the organisation 
operates in (i.e. the higher the uncertainty, the more use management makes of 
social targets); and (3) the availability and validity of information (i.e. the more 
valid information available, the more use management makes of social targets) 
(Greve, 2003).  
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Research has suggested that historical and social information can be combined in 
order to create a single target (e.g. Cyert and March, 1963) or multiple target 
levels that simultaneously and jointly affect behaviour (Greve, 1998). For 
instance, March and Shapira (1992) argue that two different target levels can be 
established: one that can focus attention on survival (i.e. if performance falls 
below this target the survival of the organisation might be at risk) and another one 
that can focus attention on improvement. For example, an organisation with a 
performance similar to that of their competitors might pay attention to an 
established social target, while an organisation close to failure would pay attention 
to an established survival target (Greve, 2003). 
2.5.2.2. Biases during the target-setting process 
Greve’s (2003) work also highlights two types of bias that may appear during the 
target setting process: On the one hand, the information used for generating 
targets may be biased. In the case of social targets, for example, information tends 
to be more readily available for high-performing organisations or for publicly 
quoted organisations; thus, important information from organisations that are not 
high-performers or those that are privately owned may be omitted from the target 
setting analysis. Another information bias may occur when managers are selecting 
the organisations they want to compare their performance against. Some 
organisations may choose to compare themselves against other organisations that 
have similar performance, whilst other organisations might prefer to compare 
themselves against high-performing organisations or against low-performing 
organisations.  
In the case of historical targets, the data used for generating the targets might be 
based on a small number of periods, as management tends to have a short-term 
view of performance (e.g. the last two years). Moreover, management tends to 
perceive and treat differently high past performance information and low past 
performance information (Greve, 2003; Meindly and Ehrlich, 1987; Salancik and 
Meindl, 1984). Managers tend to associate high performance with their internal 
actions and decisions; whilst they tend to associate low performance with 
environmental conditions. For that reason, when setting targets managers tend to 
believe that only high performance is accurate and they have the tendency to 
assign greater weights to this type of performance information than to less 
favourable past performance information.  
On the other hand, biases can also be introduced when the information used for 
target setting is ill processed or analysed. For example, the wrong forecasting 
techniques may be used or the information may be processed in a way that always 
leads to either higher or lower targets (e.g. when managers are driven by self-
improvement beliefs and they always add a specific percentage to the forecasting 
figures regardless of the organisation’s conditions (Lant, 1992)).  
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2.5.3. Setting targets: Insights from public sector and economic 
research 
The UK public sector has been using performance targets for many years now. 
During this time, researchers have identified critical problems associated with the 
process of setting effective performance targets. According to Hood (2006) there 
are at least three major problems related to target-setting processes: 
 One is a problem known as the ratchet effect (e.g. Bain, Keren, Miller and 
Thornton, 1987; Brown, Miller and Thornton, 1994). When performance 
targets are based on last year’s performance only, the people that have to 
deliver those targets tend to restrict their performance to well below their 
possibilities. A clever individual under these circumstances knows that if s/he 
performs extremely well this year, his/her targets will be increased for the 
following year and perhaps then he will not be able to reach them as well. This 
problem causes performance to become mediocre and not excellent.  
 A second problem is the one known as the threshold effect. Some 
organisations apply a uniform output target to all units (e.g. 10% increases for 
all sales territories). This method of setting targets does not motivate people to 
perform at their best. It does not take into consideration the different potentials 
of each unit and this issue may encourage top performers to reduce the quality 
or quantity of their performance to just what the target requires.  
 A third problem refers to the type of data used for setting targets. If 
performance results are manipulated or distorted throughout the performance 
measurement process, then the performance targets established will be flawed. 
This will generate the typical effect of “hitting the target and missing the 
point” (Hood, 2006, p. 516). 
2.5.4. Setting targets: Insights from quality management research 
and practice 
According to quality management researchers and consultants, the main issue 
associated with targets is that they can function only as well as the system allows 
them (Gregory, 2007). Deming, for example, suggests that “95% or more of 
variation in performance is in the process or system2
                                                 
 
2 A process “can be defined as a set of causes or conditions that repeatedly come together to 
transform inputs into outcomes. The inputs might include: people, materials, or information. The 
outcomes include: products, services, behaviour or people” (Nolan and Provost, 1993, p. 2). A 
system is “an interdependent group of items, people, or processes with a common purpose” (Nolan 
and Provost, 1993, p. 2) 
” (Seddon, 2003, p. 35). 
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Thus, when managers focus on the control and motivation of employees’ 
performance by means of performance targets and incentives, they are only 
working on 5% of variation, which is an important waste of management 
resources. According to Deming (1990), the best way to solve the problem is to 
improve the system by finding out where the variation is coming from and how it 
can be decreased. For succeeding in this process, leadership skills are crucial.  
Understanding the concept of variation in organisational contexts is critical for 
Deming and his followers. There is variation in all aspects of organisational life 
(Nolan and Provost, 1993). Managers make constant decisions based on the 
interpretation of the variation they encounter. For example, if there is a decrease 
in sales for two months in a row; then, managers may think: Does the data 
indicate a trend? What actions should be taken? What is this variation telling me? 
It is vital that management understands some of the basic statistical concepts 
associated with variation (Deming, 1990). They need to be able to differentiate 
between common and special causes of variation (Shewhart, 1931/1980). 
Common causes are causes that are inherently part of the process (or system) hour 
after hour, day after day, and affect everyone working in the process. Special 
causes are causes that are not part of the process (or system) all of the time or that 
do not affect everyone, but arise because of specific circumstances (Nolan and 
Provost, 1993). Common and special causes in a process or system can be 
identified with the help of a control chart3
                                                 
 
3 A control chart is the means to operationally define the concept of a stable process. It consists on 
three lines and points plotted on a graph (see figure 2). The x-axis of the graph can indicate a time 
line or as in the case of Figure 2, the performance results of each individual. The y-axis of the 
graph indicates the results of the performance measure being plotted (e.g. sales volume). The 
centreline tends to represent the average of the data. The other two lines represent the upper and 
lower limits of control. Variation above or below these limits signals special causes. Variation 
within the control limits signals common causes (Deming, 1990; Shewhart, 1931/1980). 
 (Shewhart, 1931/1980). If a process 
only has common causes affecting its performance then it is said to be a stable 
process, which facilitates the development of predictions about future 
performance. When a process is said to be unstable (has common and special 
cause affecting performance) its performance becomes unpredictable.  
The use of variation analysis as suggested by Deming (1990) contrasts with the 
use of performance targets as suggested by authors such as Locke & Latham 
(1990) (see Table 1). Performance targets reflect variation but this variation is 
interpreted as “good” (i.e. performance above target) or “bad” (i.e. performance 
below target). The “good” or “bad” interpretation of variation tends to form the 
basis for establishing rewards or control actions, but does not provide useful 
information for improvement.  
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Table 3. Different interpretations of variation (adapted from Nolan and Provost, 1993, p.3) 
 Variation that indicates “good” or “bad” 
performance (e.g. Locke and Latham, 1990) 
Variation that results from common and 
special causes (e.g. Deming, 1990) 
Focus Outcomes of the process. Causes of variation in the process. 
Aim Classify outcomes as acceptable or not. Provide the basis for action on the process. 
Basis What the customer wants or needs. What the process is actually delivering. 
Methods Specifications, budgets, forecasts, numerical 
targets, other tools for judging performance. 
Control charts. 
 
An example extracted from Nolan and Provost (1993, p. 6-7) helps to better 
illustrate the two ways of interpreting variation and their effects: 
A marketing manager establishes a forecast of sales for three regions. Each 
regional sales manager uses this forecast to set targets for each of the sales 
people under his supervision. Each sales person receives a sales bonus of 1% of 
his or her salary for each percentage point that sales exceeded the target. The 
Figure below shows the sales average for the first two quarters per individual. 
The sales are expressed as a percent of their targets. All sales people in region 1 
exceeded their targets so they all received their bonuses. In region 2, no one 
received a bonus. In region 3, four out of ten received a bonus. The bonuses were 
distributed based on the comparison of the sales results to the target derived from 
the sales forecast. This analysis did not take into account the variation among the 
sales people that was attributable to the system. 
Figure 8. Sales results versus sales targets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure below shows the use of control charts to analyse the performance of 
the salespeople. (The width of the control limits depends on the quarter-to-
quarter variation in sales for each person within a region). In region 1, the sales 
for two sales people were below the lower control limit. This indicates that their 
performance was worse than would have been expected from the system. Is the 
responsibility of the sales manager to determine what the special cause was and 
to provide leadership to remove it? The special cause might or might not be 
within the control of the individual sales person. Those below the control limit 
might need training, or they might not be suited for work in sales.  
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Figure 9. Control charts for sales results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using a control chart to analyse the performance of salespeople allows the sales 
manager to determine which of the sales people are performing in the system and 
which might need special attention. No such information is obtained when the 
sales data are compared to the target (see Figure 8). In region 3, no one was 
outside the control limits indicating that the variation among sales people was 
due to common causes and not to the individuals. It would have been a mistake 
of the sales manager to try to use these sales results to rank or reward their sales 
people. 
Understanding variation is key to understanding performance. It assumes that 
some differences in performance are as a result of pure chance. When we use 
targets to set bonus levels, we must always understand and accept this random 
element. However, if we don’t have a bonus level set, we will find that we have 
made a change to the process and we may find ourselves in the situation where the 
whole level of performance is reduced right across the sales force. 
Now the research on target-setting processes has been reviewed, we turn our 
attention to the factors affecting people’s perceptions of the level of difficulty of 
their targets. 
2.6. Factors affecting people’s perceptions of target 
difficulty 
The level of target difficulty has been found to be a key dimension influencing the 
effectiveness of performance targets as it has a direct impact on people’s 
expectancy of success (Chowdhury, 1993; Garland, 1984; Motowidlo, Loehr and 
Dunnette, 1978). The level of target difficulty is based on people’s perceptions. 
Given the same performance target, some people may perceive it to be extremely 
high; some people may perceive it to be moderately high; and others may perceive 
it to be low. These perceptions depend on a variety of factors, which can be 
individually based –i.e. depend on the personal characteristics of the individual 
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that needs to reach the performance targets– or organisationally based –i.e. depend 
on the managerial practices that a company employs. To our knowledge, little 
research has explored these factors. The work of Chowdhury (1993) has looked at 
the effects of two different factors, one individual factor –self-efficacy– and one 
organisational factor –performance feedback received from the supervisor– on 
people’s expectancy of success but not on the level of perceived target difficulty. 
Therefore, there is a need for further research to explore this gap in our 
knowledge. 
2.7. Summary 
In this section we have highlighted the results from previous research looking at 
the impact of performance targets. We have highlighted three gaps in the literature 
that need further investigation. These are: 
1) the interrelations between performance targets, performance measures and 
incentive pay;  
2) the development and implementation of performance targets; and  
3) the factors that influence people’s perceptions about the level of difficulty 
of their targets.  
We have also reviewed other areas of research including compensation, 
performance measurement and organisational learning to help us address the gaps 
we found in the literature.  
The next section presents the research methods used in this study and describes 
both the case study methodology and the survey we undertook. 
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3. Research methodology 
The main purpose of this research is threefold:  
 To investigate the effects of sales performance targets in relationship with 
incentive pay plans and performance measures. 
 To search for key issues associated with the process of setting sales targets.  
 To examine how specific organisational factors affect sales people’s 
perceptions about the level of difficulty of their targets. 
In order to address these objectives two different research methods have been 
employed in parallel. These research methods are case study and a survey 
research. Each of these methods is now described in turn. 
3.1. Case study research 
The objectives of the case study research have been to better understand the sales 
performance targets, measures and incentives that the selected companies use; the 
process these companies follow for setting their performance targets; and the 
effects that sales people believe performance targets, measures and incentives 
have on behaviour.  
Four different case studies were conducted in the UK between September 2006 
and February 2007. Organisations were selected mainly based on: (1) their 
industry (high volatility vs. low volatility) as this was considered a key factor that 
affected the target-setting process (Greve, 2003); and (2) based on the size of their 
sales force –that is sales forces with less than 30 sales representatives due to a 
research constraint which was limited monetary resources. A case study protocol 
was produced to guide this process (see Appendix B). In each company, we 
interview 6 to 7 people belonging to the different levels of the sales function 
(sales director, sales managers and sales representatives) and those in charge of 
setting the performance targets for the sales force.   
In total we interviewed over 26 people with each interview lasting for about 1.5 
hours. The information recorded from each case was analysed using qualitative 
data analysis –that is content analysis– in order to identify key aspects of the 
organisation’s target setting process, beliefs and consequences of the use of 
performance targets. Then we compared our findings across cases. As far as was 
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possible, two researchers conducted the cases and analysed the results separately. 
Then, we compared and cross-checked their findings to enhance the reliability of 
the study. Table 4 introduces a summary of key aspects of each of the four case 
study companies4
Table 4. Characteristics of case study companies 
; Table 5 gives a brief description of the type of incentive pay, 
performance measures and targets used by each company. Table 6 reviews the 
target setting processes developed by each company. 
Case study Sales force 
size 
Level of 
industry 
volatility  
Number of 
interviews 
conducted 
Secondary information/ 
evidence provided 
High Street Bank 28 sales reps. High 7 Yes 
Media Company 30 sales reps. High 6 Yes 
Cement Company 25 sales reps. Low 7 Yes 
Gas Company 26 sales reps. Low 6 Yes 
 
Table 5. Incentive pay structure, performance measures and targets of case study companies 
Case 
study 
Brief description of incentive pay structure, performance measures and targets 
Media 
Company 
 Three output measures are used to assess performance at team level and to 
determine bonus payments. These measures focus on sales revenues and volume. 
They assess performance per brand and at national level.  
 In addition to the three output performance measures, the sales department uses 
another set of output performance measures (e.g. number of existing clients, drop 
offs, etc.) and behavioural performance measures but these are not linked to pay.  
 Bonus is paid taking into account results against targets. Everyone within the sales 
team is entitled to have a bonus. A portion of the bonus is paid monthly and the 
other portion is paid quarterly. Sales people’s bonus is based on team and brand 
performance. The size of the bonus goes from 10% to 60% of salary depending on 
the sales role and on the person.  
 Together with the bonus scheme, the company conducts periodic performance 
contests that reward creativity.  
 Targets are set for the three output measures linked to incentive pay.  
 
                                                 
 
4 Due to confidentiality agreements little information about each of the case study business and 
operations can be provided. 
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Case 
study 
Brief description of incentive pay structure, performance measures and targets 
Gas 
Company 
 Bonus is paid taking into account results against targets. Everyone within the sales 
team is entitled to receive a bonus. Bonus targets are annual but payments are made 
twice a year. 
 Performance is assessed at two different levels: organisational and individual. 
Organisational performance is measured in financial terms only (i.e. profit) and has 
a weight of 40% of the bonus. Individual performance is measured taking into 
consideration several dimensions of performance; even though the majority of them 
are also financial. The individual performance measures have a weight of 60% of 
the bonus (it is important to note that all the individual performance targets need to 
be met to a certain extent in order for the 60% of bonus to be paid out). 
 The company also has a performance development system which is linked to base 
pay. Some of the measures included in the performance development system are 
duplicated in the bonus scheme.  
 Together with the bonus scheme, the company also has sales people’s recognition 
plans and performance contests. 
 The company has a balanced scorecard but the relationship of this system to pay is 
ambiguous.  
 
Cement 
Company 
 This company uses several key performance indicators (KPIs) to determine sales 
people bonus pay. They tend to be based on: contribution (i.e. margin) and sales 
volume. These KPIs are adapted to the different product lines. 
 There are other aspects of performance such as number of calls made by each sales 
person that are also measured but are not linked to pay.  
 Targets are set for all the performance measures used to determine sales people’s 
bonuses. 
 Sales people’s bonuses are based on the achievement of volume and contribution 
performance targets. Everyone within the sales team is entitled to have a bonus. If 
performance is on-target, sales people will receive about 10% of their base pay as a 
bonus. There is a different performance-payout relationship for each of the 
measures/targets included in the bonus scheme.  
 
High 
Street 
Bank 
 Sales people’s bonuses are based on the achievement of four key performance 
indicators (KPIs) that look at both sales value and sales volume. The sales 
department uses a number of additional performance measures (e.g. market share, 
drop-out rate) to assess its performance but these measures are not linked to bonus 
payments.  
 Everyone within the sales team is entitled to have a bonus. However, there are two 
different structures of sales bonuses regardless of the sales role. There is one 
structure designed for new recruits and there is another structure designed for people 
that have been with the company for several years. The size of the salary received 
by new recruits is smaller than the one received by more experienced sales people. 
However, the potential variable pay received by new recruits is higher than the one 
received by more experienced sales people. New recruits have a cap in their bonus at 
120% of target achieved, whilst more experience sales people have a cap in their 
bones at 200% of target achieved.  
 Together with the sales bonus, sales people’s behaviours are assessed according to a 
competency framework.  
 In addition to the bonus scheme, there are numerous recognition plans and 
performance contests that reward good performance both monetarily and non-
monetarily. 
Table 6. Description of the target setting process used by each company 
Company Brief description of the target-setting process 
Media 
Company 
 At the start of the year monthly targets are set by the sales director in collaboration 
with a person from the finance department. 
 Targets are set for each sales team and for each brand.  
 Targets are calculated taking into account a variety of factors: last-year results; 
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Company Brief description of the target-setting process 
audience data (estimations); market analysis; Inputs from first-line sales managers; 
and company budgets. However, the weight given to each factor and the 
mathematical model used for computing the targets is unclear.  
 Targets are “given” to the sales people. The exact method used for communicating 
the targets is not formally defined. 
 
Gas 
Company 
 Targets are set taking into consideration the following factors: Budgets, past territory 
performance (plus growth percentage); management aspirations; forecast of territory 
events (e.g. business closures, etc.) 
 KPIs’ targets tend to be similar for all the territories 
 Target are set using a top-down approach 
 Targets are set annually but they are reviewed quarterly. 
  
Cement 
Company 
 The sales director with the assistance of one of his team members sets the targets for 
all the sales force. 
 Targets are set annually and they are not reviewed during the year.  
 According to the information presented to us several factors are taken into account 
when calculating the targets. However, we are unclear (as well as the sales people 
interviewed) about the specific factors or the mathematical model used during the 
target setting process. 
 Targets are set for all the performance measures used to determine sales people’s 
bonuses. 
 Targets are normally communicated in March/April (even though the target period 
starts in January). The exact method used for communicating the targets is not 
formally defined. 
 
High 
Street 
Bank 
 Based on forecast performance, the marketing department sets the targets for the 
sales department.  
 The gross targets produced by the marketing department are adjusted by the sales 
director in order to make sure they are “stretch”.  
 Gross targets are reviewed bi-annually (May and Sep). 
 Individual targets per territory are set for the four key performance indicators the 
sales department uses to assess its performance. 
 Targets are set for each sales person based on a mathematical model that takes into 
account the following factors: length of time a sales person has been in his/her 
territory; previous individual performance against target; geographic location of key 
corporate relationships; expectations of business delivery at regional level; historical 
performance of each territory; and two additional environmental factors that cannot 
be disclosed due to confidentiality issues.  
 Targets are communicated by email each month. No previous agreement is 
considered. 
 
The objective of this section is to present the methodology and so the description 
provided here is limited. We will present the analysis and findings in detail in 
section 4 of the report 
3.2. Survey research 
The objectives of the survey research are to examine in more detail sales people’s 
knowledge and opinions about their incentive system, performance measures and 
targets; as well as to investigate a set of organisational factors that may affect 
people’s perceptions on the level of difficulty of their targets. The survey has been 
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designed with a conceptual framework in mind, which is shown in Figure 10. The 
specific hypotheses that support this framework are presented in Table 7. 
 
Figure 10. Survey conceptual framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
It must be highlighted that in order to narrow the focus of this survey, we only 
analyse the impact of six organisational factors on sales people’s perceived level 
of performance target difficulty. It is assumed that this perception then has a 
negative effect on sales people’s expectancy of success –that is, the higher the 
level of target difficulty, the lower the sales person’s expectancy of success. This 
in turn has a positive effect on individual behaviour and performance –that is, the 
lower the sales person’s expectancy of success the lower his performance will be 
and the more dysfunctional his/her behaviours. The empirical relationship 
between perceived target difficulty, expectancy of success and individual 
behaviour and performance is not fully explored in the survey as it has been 
already well researched in past studies (e.g. Badovick, 1990; Chowdhury, 1993; 
Schwepker and Good, 1999, Schweitzer, Ordonez and Douma, 2004).  
Table 7. Summary of research hypotheses5
Hypotheses 
 
Brief supporting argument 
H1: Sales people with high levels of role clarity 
are more likely to perceive their targets as 
less difficult. 
When sales people know exactly what their role and 
performance expectations are they can better estimate the 
actions required in order to achieve their targets, which will 
have a positive influence on their perceptions about how 
difficulty their targets are and how capable they are of 
delivering them.  
 
                                                 
 
5 No specific hypothesis is proposed about the variables selected as control variables.  
Organisational context factors
• Role clarity
• Time availability (lack of role overload)
• Work discretion/ decision-making 
autonomy
• Managerial & peer support
• Org. culture risk values
• Participation in target setting
• Perceived target 
difficulty
Expectancy of 
success
Control variables 
• Age
• Gender
• Experience on the job
Individual 
behaviour and 
performance
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Hypotheses Brief supporting argument 
H2: Sales people with high levels of time 
available are more likely to perceive their 
target as less difficult. 
When sales people are not overloaded with work 
assignments and have time to strategically think about their 
actions; they will feel more competent and this feeling will 
have a positive effect on their perceptions about how 
difficult their targets are and how capable they are of 
delivering them.  
 
H3: Sales people with high levels of decision 
autonomy are more likely to perceive their 
targets as less difficult. 
When sales people have more discretion about the decisions 
and actions they make; then they will feel more ownership 
of their work and more competent, which in turn will have a 
positive effect on their perceptions about how difficult their 
targets are and how capable they are of delivering them.  
 
H4: Sales people with high levels of managerial 
and peer support are more likely to perceive 
their targets as less difficult. 
When sales people receive continuous feedback and support 
from their superiors and peers, they will perceived to be 
more in control of their performance results, which will 
positively affect their perceptions about how difficult their 
targets are and about how capable they are of attaining 
them.  
H5: Sales people working in a company, which 
organisational cultural values encourage 
risk taking are more likely to perceive their 
targets as less difficult. 
When sales people work in supportive organisations where 
risk-taking, continuous learning and improvement are 
encouraged; they will perceive to be more in control of their 
performance results, which in turn will positively affect 
their perceptions about how difficult their targets are and 
about how capable they are of attaining them. 
 
H6: Sales people with a high level of 
participation in their target setting process 
are more likely to perceive their targets as 
less difficult. 
When sales people highly contribute to the target setting 
process; they will feel to be more ownership of their targets 
and more in control of their performance, which will in turn 
have a positive effect on how difficulty their targets are and 
about how capable they are of delivering them.  
 
The next sections explain how the survey research and its questionnaire have been 
developed; the type of variables that have been included in the questionnaire and 
the type of data analysis that have been performed.  
3.2.1. The questionnaire and sample 
A questionnaire was developed based on previous academic work in order to be 
able to capture sales people’s perceptions and understanding about their incentive 
plan, performance measures, targets and some other contextual factors. A pilot 
survey was conduced with Cranfield alumni working in sales roles. A total of 70 
questionnaires were returned and based on the analysis of these data the survey 
was reviewed and improved. The final version of the questionnaire was produced 
on paper and on-line. A copy of the questionnaire was sent out to the sales force 
of each of the case study companies (Appendix C presents a copy of the 
questionnaire). A total of 95 questionnaires were collected (87% response rate) 
Table 8 summarises the number of responses received. 
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Table 8. Description of survey responses 
Survey sample description Results 
Pilot survey (Cranfield alumni working in sales roles) 70 (28% resp. rate) 
Survey in case study companies:  
Total number of sales people’s responses 95 (87% resp. rate) 
Responses from High Street Bank  23 (82% resp. rate) 
Responses from Media Company 28 (93% resp. rate) 
Responses from Cement Company 22 (84% resp. rate) 
Responses from Gas Company 22 (88% resp. rate) 
3.2.2. Measurement of study variables 
Table 9 presents how each of the variables included in the conceptual framework 
were measured (factor and reliability analysis of each of the variables is presented 
in Appendix F). It must be noted that not all the questions included in the 
questionnaire were devised to address the conceptual framework proposed in 
Figure 10. Some questions were included for descriptive purposes only.  
Table 9. Measurement of study variables 
Variable Survey 
questions 
Type of measure Source 
Perceived level of target difficulty Q2l Likert Scale (5 points) Cranfield 
Participation in target-setting Q2m Likert Scale (5 points) Cranfield 
Organisation’s cultural risk values Average Q3 to 
Q3f 
Continuous Hornsby, 
Kuratko, 
Zahra 
(2000) 
Work discretion/ decision-making 
autonomy 
Average Q4a 
to Q4d 
Continuous Hornsby et 
al. (2000) 
Time availability Average Q5a 
to Q5d 
Continuous Hornsby et 
al. (2000) 
Role clarity Average Q6a 
to Q6d 
Continuous Hornsby et 
al. (2000) 
Managerial and peer support Average Q6e 
to Q6h 
Continuous Ito & 
Brotheridge 
(2005) 
Experience on the job Q18 Continuous Cranfield 
Age Q11 Continuous Cranfield 
Gender Q10 Dummy Cranfield 
 
3.2.3. Data analysis methods 
Two methods of data analysis were used for examining the data extracted from the 
survey. These are correlation and multiple regression analysis. For those who are 
not familiar with these data analysis methods the following paragraphs briefly 
explain them.  
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Correlation is a measure of the linear relationship between variables. There are 
three ways in which two variables can be related: (1) positively related, (2) not 
related, and (3) negatively related. The correlation coefficient (R2) will always be 
between 1 and -1. When the correlation coefficient is 0, this means that no 
correlation between the variables exists. When doing correlation analysis, it is 
necessarily to check the significance level (p) of the correlation. If p<0.05 this 
means that the probability of this correlation being as a result of chance is low 
(less than one in 20). Under these circumstances, traditionally researchers accept 
that the correlation between the two variables exists. However, it must be 
remembered that correlations cannot be used to infer causal relationships. That is 
to say, we can accept that one variable changes with another variable, but we can 
not claim that one variable is causing the other variable to change. 
Multiple regression seeks to predict an outcome from several variables (e.g. Y= α 
+ β1 X1 + β2X2 + ε). The value of the regression coefficient α can be interpreted as 
meaning that when X1=0 and X2=0, the model predicts α of Y. β1 can be 
interpreted as representing the change in the outcome associated with a unit 
change in the predictor. For example, if our X1 variable is increased by 1 unit, 
then our model predicts that our Y variable will increase in β1. A t-statistic is 
produced for each β coefficient. It should be significant (p<.05) in order to be 
valid. Multiple regression analysis is used for prediction purposes. It cannot be 
used to infer causal relationships. Regression analysis compared to correlation 
analysis is more robust as it can take into consideration the diverse set of variables 
(X) that affect a specific outcome. 
Having described the research methods used, in the next section we will present 
the findings of this research.
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4. Research findings 
We will present the research findings here under the headings of the three research 
objectives chosen as the focus of our study. First, we will present the findings 
associated with the impact of performance targets in the context of performance 
measures and incentives. Second, key issues associated with the process of setting 
sales performance targets are summarised. Finally, we will highlight the results of 
our research into how five organisational factors affect sales people’s perception 
of target difficulty.  
4.1. The impact of performance targets in the context of 
performance measures and incentives 
For addressing this literature gap, the research team used the information 
extracted from the case study research. Based on this information, a list of 
strengths and weaknesses of the incentive system, performance measures and 
targets used by each participating company was developed (see Appendix C). The 
lists highlighted the importance of different factors associated with these three 
motivational tools. It was found that each of these tools cannot be considered in 
isolation when examining the influence on sales people’s behaviour. They are all 
interrelated and their specific design must be aligned with the organisational and 
environmental conditions of the company if they are to positively influence 
behaviour. In order to clarify the factors associated with the sales incentive 
system, its performance measures and the targets that had the greatest effects on 
behaviour, the research team developed the framework that appears in Figure 11. 
A brief description of each factor is provided below. 
Figure 11. The impact of incentives, performance measures and targets on people’s behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Eligibility
• Incentive size
• Payout 
frequency
• Performance-
payout 
relationship
• Focus
• Controllability
• Informativeness
• Alignment
• Objectivity
• Quantity
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Note: Factors are NOT located in order of importance. Equal importance is assumed.
COMMUNICATION
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Factors associated with the incentive system 
 Eligibility: This factor refers to who in the sales department is entitled to 
receive incentive pay and to how much influence each person has on sales 
performance. In order to positively affect behaviour everyone with the same 
role and influence over sales performance should be entitled to receive sales 
incentive pay. 
 Incentive size: It refers to the amount of money the firm has established as 
incentive pay for their sales people (normally calculated as a percentage of 
salary). The incentive size should be internally and externally equitable. That 
is to say, it should take into account internal equity levels and it should be in 
line with the incentive size that is typically used by peer companies. It also 
should consider how much influence sales people have over sales performance 
results. The higher the influence the larger the potential size of the incentive.  
 Payout frequency: It refers to how often incentives are paid to sales people. 
The frequency of payout should be in line with the sales processes and 
strategic planning. 
 Performance-payout relationship: It refers to the payout curve that reflects 
how incentive payments are calculated and how they vary with measured 
performance. Different design aspects are associated with performance-payout 
relationships (e.g. linear, regressive or progressive relationships between pay 
and performance; the use of caps versus no caps; payments starting at 100% of 
target or at a fraction of a target). Each design aspect needs to be aligned with 
the context in which the organisation operates as it will have different effects 
on behaviour. 
 Focus: It refers to the proportion of sales people’s incentive pay that is linked 
to individual, business unit and/or organisational performance. The focus of 
incentives needs to be in line with the way in which sales people work and the 
way in which sales tasks are interrelated.  
 Incentives review: It refers to how often the sales incentive plan is reviewed in 
order to keep it up to date and in line with market/industry practices. Incentive 
systems need to be reviewed periodically, at least once every two years and 
every time there is a strategic change in the organisation.  
 Fairness: It refers to the extent to which the sales people’s incentive plan is 
perceived to be fair by sales people. Perceptions of fairness or equity remains 
in the eyes of the beholder so management needs to make sure sales people 
perceive their incentive system to be fair.  
 Clarity: It refers to the extent to which sales people understand their incentive 
plan. Sales people need to clearly understand what are they being paid for and 
how.  
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 Communication: It refers to the way in which sales people’s incentive plan is 
communicated to the sales people and to the quality of that communication. 
Sales people need to know how their incentive system works. The more 
transparency there is with incentive information the more satisfied sales 
people will be, which will have a direct effect on their behaviour.  
 
Factors associated with the performance measures used to determine pay 
 Controllability: It refers to the extent to which sales people’s decisions and 
actions are able to influence the results of their performance measures (those 
linked to their incentive plan). The more control sales people have over their 
performance measures the more effective the measures will be.  
 Informativeness: It refers to the extent to which performance measures 
provide information to sales managers and sales people about the effect of 
sales people’s decisions and actions. It is important that the performance 
measures used for compensation purposes provide relevant information for 
decision-making to their users.  
 Alignment: It refers to the extent to which sales performance measures are 
consistent with the sales and marketing strategic objectives and the firm’s 
strategy as a whole. Performance measures need to be aligned with strategy in 
order to encourage the expected behaviours and avoid the well known topic of 
“rewarding A, while hoping for B” (Kerr, 1995). 
 Objectivity: It refers to the extent to which performance measures are based on 
observable phenomena uninfluenced by personal judgement. Those measures 
used for pay purposes need to be perceived as objectives by their users. 
Perceptions of subjectivity generate feelings of unfairness and may have 
detrimental effects on behaviour.  
 Quantity: It refers to the number of measures used to assess sales people’s 
performance and determine their incentive pay. In order to keep people 
focused, the number of performance measures used needs to be relatively 
small. Following Miller’s (1956) advice the magic number is five, plus or 
minus two.  
 Completeness: It refers to the type of performance measures that have been 
used to assess and reward performance. Do they capture the different 
dimensions of sales people’s performance? In principle, the performance 
measures used for performance evaluation and reward purposes need to reflect 
the key sales people’s performance dimensions (e.g. financial dimension, 
customer dimension). If the number of key dimensions is high, prioritisation 
and correlation analysis should be employed in order to understand how the 
different dimensions of performance interact and whether some dimensions 
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can be excluded from the incentive system as they are highly correlated with 
others6
 Agreement: It refers to the extent to which sales people agree with the 
performance measures used to assess and reward their performance. Sales 
people need to participate and accept the performance measures that are going 
to be used for assessing and rewarding their performance for better 
behavioural results. 
.  
 Reliability: It refers to the extent to which the data used for calculating the 
performance measures is reliable. If performance data is distorted or 
manipulated this will have a negative effect on behaviour. Sales people need 
to trust their performance data in order to behave appropriately. 
 Measures review: It refers to the extent to which performance measures are 
periodically reviewed and updated. Performance measures need to be 
reviewed periodically in order to make sure that they are still valid.  
 Clarity: It refers to the extent to which sales people understand the 
performance measures used to assess and reward their performance. Sales 
people need to understand how their performance measures are calculated and 
what they mean for better behavioural results.  
 Fairness: It refers to the extent to which the measures used for assessing and 
rewarding sales people’s performance are perceived to be fair. Sales people 
need to perceive that the performance measures used for assessing and 
rewarding their performance do not favour any particular territory, team or 
person for better behavioural results. 
 Communication: It refers to the way in which the performance measures and 
their results are communicated to the sales people; also, to the quality of that 
communication. Sales people need to be aware of what their performance 
measures are, why they have been chosen and how they are calculated. The 
more transparency there is with performance measurement information the 
more satisfied sales people will be, which will have a direct effect on their 
behaviour. 
 
                                                 
 
6 If two performance measures are highly correlated we can collect data on  both but just use one 
of them for pay purposes as with the information of one measure we know how the other one will 
behave (Meyer and Gupta, 1994). 
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Factors associated with performance targets 
 Achievability: It refers to the extent to which performance targets are 
perceived to be achievable by sales people. This factor is crucial when you 
take into consideration how often sales people refer to it. Sales performance 
targets need to be perceived as achievable by their users. If they are perceived 
as unattainable, they negatively affect motivation.  
 Completeness: It refers to the extent to which the variety of factors affecting 
sales people’s performance is taken into consideration during the target-setting 
process. The use of past performance only for setting targets has been found 
detrimental as it generates what is known as the ratchet effect (Hood, 2006). 
There are many factors that can affect sales people’s performance (e.g. 
environmental, individual, etc.) so it is important that management includes 
these factors when deciding on which targets to establish.  
 Reliability: It refers to the extent to which the internal and external data used 
to set targets are reliable. The data use for setting targets must be reliable. If it 
is not, there is a high probability that targets will be perceived as unachievable 
or distorted. This perception will have a negative effect on sales people’s 
behaviour.  
 Agreement: It refers to the extent to which targets are agreed between sales 
people and their managers. Each sales person must accept and agree with his 
or her performance targets in order to be committed to delivering them. If 
targets are perceived to be given, sales people’s satisfaction with targets 
decreases and this affects their motivation to attain them.  
 Targets review: It refers to how often the targets are set and reviewed. It is 
important that performance targets are periodically reviewed in order to keep 
being valid and achievable. It is also important that the performance of sales 
people against targets is periodically reviewed and communicated as it has a 
direct effect on sales people’s behaviour (e.g. Chowdhury, 1993). 
 Fairness: It refers to the extent to which the performance targets are perceived 
to be fair. Sales people must perceive their targets to be fair and equitable –i.e. 
that the targets do not favour any particular territory, team or person.  
 Clarity: It refers to the extent to which sales people understand their targets 
and the target-setting process. Sales people need to clearly understand their 
targets and how they are estimated as this seems to have a positive effect on 
their commitment with the targets and on their motivation to achieve them.  
 Communication: It refers to the way in which performance targets are 
communicated to the sales people and to the quality and timing of that 
communication. Performance targets need to be communicated clearly. Sales 
people need to know what the target is, how it has been calculated, who is 
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responsible for achieving them, how well are they doing against it, etc. The 
timing of the communication is also important. When performance targets are 
set they need to be communicated as soon as the target period starts and not 
later. Sales people’s performance against target needs to be communicated as 
often as possible.  
4.2. Issues associated with the sales target-setting process 
In order to give an answer to this research gap, the research team used the 
information extracted from the case study research on the target-setting processes 
used by the four case study companies. The process followed by each of these 
organisations had the following things in common: 
 The forecast was mainly based on past performance. This type of forecast 
generates what is known as the ratchet effect. Salespeople who expect to be 
with the company for the next target period have a perverse reason not to 
exceed targets even if they could easily do so. For instance, a clever 
salesperson will reach 105 per cent of his target in order to get his/her bonus, 
never 120 per cent as this higher figure will generate a harder target for his/her 
next financial year. The ratchet effect causes salespeople to restrict their 
performance to well below their potential. 
 Targets were allocated inappropriately across the sales force. This aspect of 
the target-setting process generated what is known as the threshold effect. 
According to this effect, a uniform performance target is applied to all sales 
units or regions without recognising their contextual differences. This type of 
target gives no incentive to excellence and they may indeed encourage top 
performers to reduce the quality or quantity of their performance to just what 
the target requires.  
 Targets were perceived to be either two high or two low. When targets were 
set too high, sales people became discouraged and de-motivated. Furthermore, 
this type of targets generated dysfunctional behaviours in the sales force such 
as outcomes distortion or “window dressing”. When targets were set too low, 
the maximum potential of sales people was not realised and additional 
bonuses were paid out without a real increase in true performance.  
 Some targets were based on the wrong performance measures. Performance 
measures were not reviewed periodically. Some performance measures were 
obsolete and no longer linked with the business strategy. However, they were 
still being used in the sales incentive system for target setting purposes. This 
issue caused sales people to typically refer to the phrase “hitting the target and 
missing the point”.   
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 Targets were entirely based on financial indicators. This was the case even 
though most of the organisations studied emphasised areas such as customer 
relationships and employees’ satisfaction in their sales strategy.  
 The data analysis process on which targets were based was poor and lacked 
rigour. Data was analysed without taking into consideration critical statistical 
rules and techniques. In addition to this, data was superficially studied, even 
though organisations had the IT system capabilities to conduct in-depth 
analysis.  
 Targets were not periodically reviewed. Once the targets were set they were 
not reviewed until the end of the target period (e.g. every quarter) unless some 
major event happened. This issue generated distrust over the targets as they 
did not reflect specific contextual changes that occurred throughout the target 
period. 
 Targets were “given” to the sales people. There was little communication and 
negotiation over the performance targets, which generated a lack of ownership 
over the targets. It also produced a lack of understanding of how the targets 
were set and how they needed to be attained.   
 The interrelation between targets was not considered during the target-setting 
process. As a result, some targets were inconsistent with each other. They 
could not all be attained. 
 Agreed action plans were the exception and not the norm. Action plans were 
left to the discretion of the individual sales person. Some sales people and 
teams had very rigorous action plans but others had none. Successful plans 
were not openly shared among the sales force as there was a culture of 
“healthy” internal competition which limited collaboration and organisational 
learning.  
In sum, the people interviewed believed that the target-setting process of their 
companies did not generate the “right” performance targets nor did it seem to 
generate the “right” environment for those targets to be achieved. In general, as it 
was also revealed by the responses to the research questionnaire, sales people 
were very dissatisfied with their targets and they believed that the impact of 
targets on behaviour was not being positive (see Figures 12 and 13). Based on the 
insights extracted from each of the companies target setting processes and on the 
knowledge obtained from the literature reviewed (see Section 2), the research 
team elaborated a specific model, which aim is to improve the way in which 
performance targets are set.  
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Figure 12. Perceived satisfaction with targets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Perceived impact of performance targets on behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A comprehensive model for setting performance targets 
The following model includes ten steps that comprise the key activities that are 
required for ensuring that the performance measures used in the target setting 
process and the final targets agreed are as effective as possible (see Figure 14)7
                                                 
 
7   The Cranfield Target-Setting Wheel can be used at all levels of the organisation –that is 
corporate level, business unit, department and individual teams. For illustration purposes, the 
perspective used here for the description of the framework is the corporate level. 
. 
Most organisations already perform most of these activities when setting their 
targets (the highlighted steps in Figure 15 show those activities that are typically 
conducted by organisations). However, there are other activities such as the 
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understanding of variation or the discussion and agreement of an action plan that 
seem to be completely ignored during the target-setting process.  
Figure 14. The target-setting wheel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Target-setting activities typically performed by organisations 
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 Review stakeholder expectations: The first step that should be undertaken 
when developing performance targets is a review of the organisation’s 
stakeholder expectations. Questions such as “who are the organisation’s 
stakeholders?” and “what do they expect from this organisation?” are critical 
at this stage (Neely, Adam, Kennerley, 2002). This exercise will determine the 
areas that the organisation need to address in order to be perceived as 
successful. 
 Strategic objectives clarification/selection: Once the stakeholders’ 
expectations have been identified, the next step is to articulate these 
expectations into strategic objectives. Strategic objectives are clear statements 
of what the organisation aims to achieve. They must be few in number and 
they should address those key stakeholders’ “needs” and “wants” (e.g. 
customers, employees, financial markets, etc.).  
 Define the organisation’s success map (also known as “strategy map” (Kaplan 
and Norton, 2004)). A success map is a diagram that shows the cause-and-
effect relationships among the different strategic objectives (Neely et al, 
2002). It describes how the organisation creates value to their stakeholders. 
 Objectives prioritisation: Some strategic objectives will have more relevance 
than others at particular points in time. Therefore, it is crucial that the 
organisation clarifies its priorities within the success map. 
 Operationalisation: The next step is to operationalise the different strategic 
objectives. This means defining how each strategic objective is going to be 
measured. Measures can be quantitative or qualitative but they should be 
clearly stated. It is common for organisations to denominate these measures 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). 
 Data collection: Once strategic objectives have been translated into clear 
KPIs, the next step is to define the data collection method that is going to be 
implemented for each KPI. At this stage it is important to decide the 
information system that is going to be used (e.g. Excel, SAP, etc.), the data 
source, the individuals that are going to be in charge of collecting and 
computing the data, and the frequency of data required.  
 Data analysis: At least two important aspects of data analysis must be 
conducted for each KPI. These are forecasting and capability analysis:  
Forecasting: When conducting a forecast exercise, careful consideration must 
be given to the methods used and to the intervening factors selected 
(Armstrong, 2001). As a rule of thumb, the more uncertainty there is in a 
specific market the more number of factors will be required in the forecasting 
(e.g. competitors’ data, economic environment, internal capabilities) as 
historical information (i.e. past performance) will not be a useful predictor of 
future performance (Saffo, 2007).  
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Capability analysis: After data has been collected for a particular KPI a 
rigorous analysis of this data must be conducted. The objectives of this 
analysis are (1) to understand how capable the organisation is at delivering the 
forecast figures, and (2) to identify the actions that must be taken in order to 
enable the organisation to deliver the forecast figures. A helpful tool at this 
stage is the use of control chart analysis (e.g. Deming, 1986). For instance, if a 
strategic objective is suggesting a sales growth figure of 7 percent for the next 
financial year and monthly historical data of the last three years suggests that 
7 percent is outside the capability of the existing process, the target may be 
unachievable with the existing organisational processes. If 7 percent sales 
growth must be attained in order to ensure organisational competitiveness, 
then the way in which the organisation operates must be changed (e.g. by 
increasing the sales force size, introducing a new training/coaching 
programme or other means). Apart from control charts there are other tools 
that can help organisations identify their capabilities for delivering a forecast 
figure. For example, matrices that incorporate several KPIs’ forecasting 
figures can be used for investigating the interrelations between the KPIs and 
how likely is an organisation to achieve a KPI without necessitating a trade-
off with another (e.g. Donaldson, 1985).  
 Set targets: Once a forecast has been conducted and a proper capability 
analysis has been developed then the next step is to decide on specific 
performance targets for the organisation’s KPIs.  
 Action plan design: After performance targets have been agreed, organisations 
need to spend the time deciding on the actions that will help them achieve 
their targets.  
 Action plan discussion and agreement: Each target must be communicated 
together with the action plan designed to reach it. The action plan MUST be 
discussed and agreed with the team or individual who is going to be 
accountable for reaching the target. Action plans should not be “given”, they 
should always be discussed and agreed.  
4.3. Factors affecting sales people’ perception about the 
level of target difficulty 
In order to investigate the factors that have an impact on sales people’s 
perceptions of target difficulty, the research team used the data gathered through 
the questionnaire completed by the sales people working in each of the case study 
companies. The survey data was analysed using correlation and multiple 
regression analysis (the descriptive statistics of the survey are presented in the 
Appendix F). As Figure 16 and 17 suggests, more than half of the sales people 
surveyed perceived their targets to be difficult to achieve and thought that by the 
end of the year their performance was going to be below target. As it was found in 
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the literature review, these perceptions of failure to achieve targets can have a 
very strong effect on behaviour (e.g. Chowdhury, 1993; Greve, 2003; Schwepker 
and Good, 1999).  
Figure 16. Perceived target difficulty                                                                                                  
(Response to Q2l- My bonus performance targets are difficult to achieve) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Perceived level of bonus achievement at the end of the year 
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4.3.1. Results of hypotheses testing 
According to the data obtained from the regression analysis, the following can be 
said about the hypotheses proposed in Section 3.2. The results of the correlation 
and regression analysis performed are presented in Table 10 and 11.  
 Hypothesis 1 refers to the negative relationship between sales people’s role 
clarity and their perception about the level of difficulty of their targets. As it 
can be seen in Table 11, this hypothesis is supported by the data. When sales 
people have a clear idea of what their role and performance expectations are, 
they are more likely to perceive their targets as less difficult. 
 Hypothesis 2 refers to the negative relationship between sales people’s time 
availability and their perception about the level of difficulty of their targets. 
Table 11 shows that this hypothesis is not supported by the data. Even though 
the sign of the beta coefficient is negative; it is not significant at p ≤ .05.  
 Hypothesis 3 relates to the negative relationship between sales people’s level 
of decision-making autonomy and their perception about the level of difficulty 
of their targets. Table 11 paradoxically shows that this hypothesis is not 
supported by the empirical evidence. What is more, the data suggests that the 
relationship between sales people’s level of decision-making autonomy and 
their perception about the level of difficulty of their targets is positive rather 
than negative. This means that the more autonomy sales people have the more 
difficult they perceive their targets to be.  
 Hypothesis 4 refers to the negative relationship between sales people’s level of 
managerial and peer support and their perception about the level of difficulty 
of their targets. Table 11 shows that this hypothesis is not supported by the 
data as the beta coefficient is not significant at p ≤ .05. 
 Hypothesis 5 proposes that the relationship between organisational cultural 
risk values and sales people’s perception about the level of difficulty of their 
targets is negative. That is when sales people work in supportive organisations 
where risk-taking, continuous learning and improvement are encouraged; they 
will perceive more ownership of their targets, which in turn will positively 
affect their perceptions about how difficult these targets are. Table 11 shows 
that this hypothesis is supported by the survey data.  
 Hypothesis 6 states that there is a negative relationship between sales people’s 
level of participation in the target-setting process and their perceptions about 
how difficult their targets are. Table 11 shows that this relationship is 
supported by the data.  
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Table 10. Results of correlation analysis (Pearson correlations) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Org. cultural risk 
values 
         
2. Work discretion .487***         
3. Time availability .259* .078        
4. Role clarity .149 .242* -.068       
5. Support .407*** .437*** .154 .411*** 1     
6. Participation in 
target setting 
.325*** .314** -.056 .267* .305**     
7. Experience on 
the job 
-.332** -.165 -.319** .191Ŧ .009 -.092    
8. Age -.411*** -.171 -.307** -.035 -.222* -.149 .584***   
9. Gender .236* -.038 .180 -.020 -.022 .070 -.234* -.334***  
10. Perceived target 
difficulty 
-.307** .034 -.238* -.136 -.095 -.317** .250* .131 -.158 
Levels of significance: *** p≤ 0.001; ** p≤ 0.01; * p≤ 0.05; Ŧ p≤ 0.10 
 
Table 11. Results from regression analysis – Dependent variable Perceived target difficulty 
Factors Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
  
Beta Std. Error Stand. Beta t-test Sig 
Constant 5.061 .955   5.298 .000 
Experience on the job .052 .022 .312 2.335 .022 
Age -.017 .011 -.204 -1.525 .132 
Gender .053 .208 .027 .253 .801 
Org. cultural risk values -.286 .153 -.243 -1.871 .065 
Work discretion .402 .148 .331 2.715 .008 
Time availability -.209 .132 -.175 -1.584 .118 
Role clarity -.256 .151 -.191 -1.693 .095 
Support .002 .150 .001 .011 .991 
Participation in target 
setting 
-.237 .088 -.296 -2.695 .009 
Durbin-Watson 2.203     
R2 2.96     
F 3.311**     
 Levels of significance: *** p≤ 0.001; ** p≤ 0.01; * p≤ 0.05; Ŧ p≤ 0.10 
 
 
So in summary, from the survey we have found that: 
1. When sales people have a clear idea of what their role and performance 
expectations are, they are more likely to perceive their targets as less 
difficult 
2. When sales people work in supportive organisations where risk-taking, 
continuous learning and improvement are encouraged; they will perceive 
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more ownership of their targets, which in turn will positively affect their 
perceptions about how difficult these targets are 
3. When sales people participate in the target-setting process their 
perceptions of target difficulty falls. 
4.3.2. Discussion of survey results 
We found data supporting three of our hypotheses about the factors that influence 
the perception of target difficulty. Given that these six hypotheses were developed 
from the literature, we should discuss the findings. Two Hypotheses (2 and 4) 
were not supported by the data and we will discuss these first. 
Hypothesis 2 relates to the belief that if sales people had greater time availability 
they would perceive their targets as being easier. This not being the case could be 
explained by considering that the sales people in the four organisations studied 
simply filled their time selling their products and services. The principle that 
“work expands to fill the time available” might be a factor here. It should also be 
noted that the majority of the sales activities were relatively straight forward 
selling relatively standard products and services through existing channels and 
that their efforts were predominantly sales focused. Although the relationship was 
not found in this study, it may be more prevalent in organisations selling complex 
products, such as aero engines, or services, such as consultancy, as these 
situations require greater emphasis on sales effectiveness rather than efficiency. 
Having more time available in these situations provides the opportunity for sales 
people to develop their sales offering and to reflect and learn. 
Hypothesis 4 relates to the level of managerial and peer support, with the 
hypothesis stating that higher levels of support reduce perceived target difficulty. 
In this study we have found that on its own this is not enough. It is interesting to 
note that when the supportive organisation encourages risk taking, learning and 
continuous improvement the perception of target difficulty does in fact fall. 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicted that the higher the level of sales people’s decision 
making autonomy the lower the perceived target difficulty. The data suggested the 
exact opposite. We interpret this finding as follows. As already discussed, the 
sales activities were relatively straight forward and standard. In these 
environments, one would expect to find a sales process with individuals working 
to that process. If the sales people believed that the process was effective and all 
they had to do was to run the process to be successful, then a well prescribed 
process (low autonomy) would be seen as helpful in achieving their target. In 
these circumstances, a less well prescribed process may be seen as less well 
developed, leading to an uncertain outcome and a greater perceived target 
difficulty. Again, in complex selling environments, autonomy might be beneficial, 
but this data suggests that autonomy of action requires further research. 
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5. Conclusions 
At present, most organisations use performance targets for influencing the 
behaviour of their employees. The results these organisations obtain are not 
always the ones expected. This issue makes managers question the true value of 
performance targets as a motivational technique. For this reason, it is important 
that the use and effects of performance targets are reviewed in order to address the 
problems that management professionals are encountering.  
There is a great amount of research looking at the impact of performance targets; 
however, there are still many gaps that require further investigation if we want to 
inform managerial practice. This study focuses on three of these research gaps. In 
particular, the study looks at: (1) the behavioural impact of sales performance 
targets in relationship with sales incentive systems and performance measures; (2) 
key issues associated with target-setting processes; and (3) the effect of a set of 
organisational factors (role clarity, managerial and peers support, time 
availability, organisational cultural risk values, participation in target setting and 
work discretion) on sales people’s perception of the level of difficulty of their 
targets. The study addresses these three research areas by conducting four case 
studies in sales organisations and a survey of 95 sales representatives.  
Regarding the first research gap, the study finds that, in sales environments, 
performance targets cannot be investigated in isolation as they are intrinsically 
related to incentive systems and performance measures. Each of these 
motivational tools needs to satisfy specific conditions in order to generate the 
expected behaviours. The nature of these conditions highly depends on the 
internal and external context of the company. In order to better present the 
conditions or factors that can have an impact on sales people’s behaviour, the 
research team has elaborated a framework that is described in Section 4.1.  
In relation to the key issues associated with target-setting processes this research 
finds that all the case study companies shared the following ten target-setting 
issues: (1) the forecast used for setting targets is mainly based on past 
performance; (2) targets are allocated inappropriately across the sales force; (3) 
targets are perceived to be inadequate (either too high or too low); (4) some 
targets are based on the wrong performance measures; (5) targets are entirely 
financial; (6) the data analysis process used is simplistic and lacks of rigour; (7) 
targets are not periodically reviewed; (8) targets are “given” to sales people; (9) 
the interrelation between performance targets is not considered during the target-
setting process; and (10) agreed action plans are normally not specified after 
targets are set. Based on this information and on the insights extracted from 
previous academic work on target-setting processes, the research team has created 
a comprehensive model, which aims are to address the problems found in this 
research and to improve target-setting processes overall.  
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As per the effect of role clarity, managerial and peers support, time availability, 
organisational cultural risk values, participation in target setting and work 
discretion on sales people’s perception of the level of difficulty of their targets, 
this research finds that management teams may positively influence sales people’s 
perceptions about how attainable their targets are by clarifying sales people’s 
roles, engaging sales people in the target-setting process, and generating an 
organisational culture that encourages risk-taking and performance improvement. 
The study also finds that by increasing sales people’s work discretion or decision-
making autonomy, management may negatively influence sales people’s 
perceptions about how attainable their targets are. This finding is somehow 
surprising as the expectation was to find a positive relationship between work 
discretion and sales people’s perceptions about how attainable their targets were. 
This result might be explained if we take into consideration that in today’s sales 
environments sales people need to work in teams and with high support from 
above and below in order to meet their targets. According to Brown et al. (2005), 
effective sales people are no longer “lone wolves” working autonomously in their 
territories but well related individuals that are able to work in close collaboration 
with others.  
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Appendix A: Summary of the marketing literature 
on the impact of sales performance targets
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Table 12. Summary of findings from previous research studies looking at the impact of performance targets 
Author & date Method & context Target 
characteristic 
Behavioural 
variable 
Findings 
Badovick (1990) Survey (277 sales reps) Attainability Emotional 
reactions & 
motivation 
 
 Emotional reactions after failure to meet a sales target have a substantial negative 
impact on subsequent salesperson motivation  
Chowdhury 
(1993) 
Experiment (113 
undergraduate 
management students) 
Attainability Effort  As quota level is increased, effort (i.e. intensity and persistence of work) increases 
only up to a point, after which increases in the level of the quota may actually 
decrease effort.  
 The impact of increased quota levels is stronger for subjects who are high in self-
efficacy than for subjects who are low in self-efficacy.  
 Giving sales people information about the probability of their success in the 
assigned task (i.e. progress towards targets) affects their personal expectancy either 
positively or negatively depending on the information supplied. This effect is 
particularly important for sales people with high-self-efficacy. 
 
Fang, Evans and 
Zou (2005) 
Two surveys multiple 
industries in two 
countries (US – 290 
resp, and China -247 
resp) 
Attainability, 
specificity, 
participation 
Performance  The effect of sales control systems on effort and performance is mediated by goal-
setting strategies. The different control systems and goal-setting strategies must be 
sensitive to the differences across national cultures. 
 In the US, when end results, such as salespeople’s sales volume and profits, are the 
primary concerns of managers, a high level of outcome control along with 
moderately difficult, specific goals should be adopted. When behaviour 
performance, such as maintaining good relationships with customers and providing 
timely feedback, is the primary concern of managers, high levels of activity control 
and capability control along with more easily obtainable, non-specific goals (e.g., do 
your best) are more desirable.  
 In China, when end results are the primary concerns of managers, a high level of 
outcome control along with moderately difficult, non-specific goals would be 
appropriate. Whereas when behaviour performance is the primary concern of 
managers, high levels of activity control and capability control along with more 
easily obtainable, non-specific goals, and a high level of goal participation should be 
adopted. 
 
Gaba and Kaira 
(1999) 
5 experiments – MBA 
students 
Attainability 
(quota linked to 
Risk taking 
behaviour 
 Salespeople’s risk taking behaviour depends on their type of compensation plan.  
 A high quota level or a rank-order contest where only the top few win induce sales 
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Author & date Method & context Target 
characteristic 
Behavioural 
variable 
Findings 
incentives) representatives to opt for high-risk prospects (e.g. getting new larger customers to 
switch from competitors), whereas a low quota level or a rank-order contest where a 
high proportion win induce sales representatives to opt for low-risk prospects 
(pursuing a small set of existing customers). 
 Quotas must be set taking into consideration not only the sales representative and 
territory characteristics, but also the strategic objectives of the product line/brand. 
 
Ross & William 
(1991) 
2 experiments with 
MBA students  
Attainability 
(targets linked to 
incentives) 
Risk taking 
behaviours 
(call selection 
decisions) 
 When performance against quota is a significant factor in a salesperson's 
compensation, that salesperson's call selection decision is influenced by his or her 
position in relation to quota. The study finds that (1) salespersons who perceive 
themselves to have no chance to attain quota are more likely to make risk averse 
decisions, (2) salespersons who have made quota are more likely to make risk 
seeking decisions, and (3) salespersons who have a chance to make quota select the 
alternative that affords the best opportunity of making quota.  
 
Schwepker and 
Good (1999) 
Survey in financial 
services (182 sales reps, 
9.2% resp. rate) 
Attainability Unethical 
behaviour  
 There is a significant relationship between quota difficulty and moral judgement 
(i.e. unethical behaviour) when salespeople foresee negative consequences for 
failing to achieve quota. 
 
Schwepker and 
Good (2004) 
Survey in financial 
services (182 sales reps, 
9.2% resp. rate) 
Attainability Performance 
and sales 
people income 
 Sales people who perceived their sales quota to be difficult had poorer performance 
evaluations and earned less income.  
 The more difficult sales people perceive quotas to be, the higher the firm’s annual 
sales revenue and the lower the individual performance ratings. 
 When no actions are taken by sales managers after sales people fail to reach their 
targets, performance tends to be lower. On the contrary, managers working/coaching 
“no-quota achievers” results in better performance. 
 The less leniency sales people are afforded in reaching their quota prior to being 
terminated, the higher their performance and their income. 
 
Winer (1973) Field experiment in 
manufacturing company 
(12 branches, 104 sales 
reps). 
Attainability Motivation & 
productivity 
 Sales people are “quota achievers” rather than “dollar maximisers”. Due to their 
typical profile, when sales people are given a target that is easily attainable their 
motivation declines; however, if they are given a target that is challenging their 
motivation increases. 
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Author & date Method & context Target 
characteristic 
Behavioural 
variable 
Findings 
Wotruba & 
Thurlow (1976) 
Survey of sales people 
(202 sales reps, 36% 
resp. rate) 
Participation in 
target-setting 
(targets linked to 
incentives) 
Accuracy of 
forecast 
 Participation in target-setting processes increases the accuracy of sales forecasts. 
Wotruba (1989) Survey in service org. -
direct selling (491 sales 
reps.) 
Participation & 
specificity 
(targets, linked 
to incentives) 
Effort & 
performance 
 This study focuses on situations in which targets are self-assigned by sales people 
rather than by superiors. The study found that those sales representatives that set 
specific performance targets compared to those that set general targets or no targets 
at all exerted more effort. However, increased effort did not relate to greater 
performance. Wotruba suggests that “since selling is a complex task, done 
independently by sales agents often without frequent and direct guidance, the 
increased effort may not pay off in greater achievement; in fact, it may cause 
frustration which leads to increases in the propensity to quit” (1989, p. 27) 
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Appendix B: Case study protocol 
 
Information included in this protocol 
Key informants to be interviewed 
Interview structure 
Interview questions 
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Key informants to be interviewed 
 Sales director  
 Sales compensation manager or equivalent 
 Senior sales managers 
 Junior sales managers 
Interview structure 
The interview structure will be as follows: 
1. Obtain pertinent information prior to the visit 
2. Obtain basis organisation information from the information provided or 
initial interview 
3. Start with the senior people and work down the organisation. The 
suggested interview order should be: 
 Sales director  
 Sales compensation manager or equivalent 
 Senior sales managers 
 Junior sales managers 
4. Each interview structure should contain 
 Introduction 
 Opening questions 
 Follow on questions 
Notes: 
 The opening questions should establish the type of performance 
measures, targets and incentives that the organisation has for sales 
people.  
 The follow on questions should focus on the impact of 
performance targets on sales people behaviour. 
 Evidence should be gathered. We don’t necessarily want to take 
away copies of the evidence, but it would be useful to have seen 
the evidence cited in response to our questions. We must record 
the type of evidence seen. 
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Interview guidelines 
Introduction 
THANK YOU very much for your willingness to participate in this research and 
for your time. The objective of this research is twofold: 
 To look at the impact of performance targets on sales people’s behaviour.  
 To examine target setting processes in order to make them more effective. 
Key concepts: performance measures/indicators, performance targets, target 
setting process, bonus/incentives, and sales people’s behaviour. 
For the following questions there are not right or wrong answers. Please answer 
them based on your knowledge and experience within this organisation. Any 
information provided will be completely CONFIDENTIAL. 
Opening questions 
1. How is the performance of sales people measured in this organisation?  
2. Is sales people’s performance linked to incentive pay?  
3. Could you please explain me your sales people’s bonus scheme? 
4. Could you please explain me how are your bonus performance targets set? 
Follow on questions 
5. What are your overall views on the performance targets used to assess sales 
people’s performance?  
6. How would you describe the effects that performance targets are having on 
sales people’s behaviour? Could you give me some examples? 
7. To what extent do you think your sales people’s performance targets 
encourage them to take risks or to go ‘the extra mile’?  
8. How would you describe “risk-taking behaviour” in your business? Could you 
give me some examples? 
9. How would you describe your organisational culture? To what extent does it 
encourage risk taking behaviours? 
10. What do you think motivates sales people? 
11. How would you describe a successful sales person in this company? 
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Appendix C: Strengths and weaknesses of incentive 
systems, performance measures and targets of case 
study companies 
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Table 13. Media Company: Strengths and weaknesses of incentive system, performance measures 
and targets 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Measures are few in number; they are considered to be 
objective, reliable, clear and linked to the overall 
firm’s strategy. 
 Sales people are very aware of their targets. They have 
a clear understanding of their meaning.  
 Everyone in the sales teams is entitled to have a 
bonus. 
 The company uses team bonuses and this type of 
bonus is perceived to be adequate as sales people 
work in teams and their individual tasks are 
interrelated. 
 The bonus payout frequency is in line with the 
industry, the sales process, and the requirements of the 
sales people. 
 The targets and the bonus scheme are reviewed 
periodically. 
 The bonus plan is complemented with specific 
recognition plans that encourage creativity. These 
plans are very well perceived by the sales force. 
 
 Performance targets are all financial-based. 
These types of targets are creating a very 
short-term focus in the sales force. Creativity 
and project quality are suffering and firm’s 
long-term success is being jeopardised. 
 Sales people feel they do not have control over 
their targets as revenue is highly influenced by 
market factors. 
 Targets are perceived as unattainable and 
imposed. This is having a direct impact on 
sales people’s motivation. 
 Sales people have difficulties understanding 
how the bonus scheme works. 
 Targets and bonus seem to be perceived as 
unfair. 
 The size of the bonus is not calculated as a 
percentage of sales people’s salary. It is a 
fixed amount. 
Interesting 
quotes about 
the impact 
of 
performance 
measures, 
targets and 
incentives. 
 “The threat of not hitting target sometimes compromises our creative output. Rather than 
spend time of positioning ourselves creatively the pressure is on us to make money first.” 
 “Customer orientation is not there at the moment […] we focus too much on revenue and 
sometimes we forget about our clients.” 
  “When the targets seem achievable they improve the atmosphere and motivation. They have 
the adverse effect when targets are known to be unachievable.”  
  “When we succeed people are happy because they get a bonus but I always feel that the 
amount of happiness delivered by meeting targets is nothing like as strong as the degree of 
unhappiness delivered by missing target”. 
 “I think in general it is better to have team and company targets as this fosters more of a 
spirit of cooperation”. 
 “We’ve got a bonus structure that is very complex. It’s not actually, but I don’t understand 
it.” 
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Table 14. Gas Company: Strengths and weaknesses of incentive system, performance measures 
and targets 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Performance measures are aligned with business 
strategy  
 Measures are periodically reviewed. 
 Sales people seem to use their performance data in 
their decisions-making process. 
 Performance targets are perceived as achievable. 
 The data used for setting targets (e.g. past territory 
performance, forecasts, etc.) is perceived as reliable. 
 The bonus scheme is perceived to be fair among 
sales people. 
 The bonus scheme is periodically reviewed and 
updated. 
 Sales people perceive that the measures and 
targets used to assess their performance are 
being imposed on them. 
 Sales people need to pay attention to too many 
targets, which may be generating a “lack of 
strategic focus”. 
 Sales people perceive targets to be unfair as 
they do not take into account the context of 
each territory. 
 Sales people have difficulties understanding 
how their performance measures, targets and 
bonuses are calculated. 
 The bonus performance-payout relationship is 
inappropriate taking into account the market in 
which the company operates. 
 There seems to be overlaps between the 
performance measures used to determine 
bonuses and the performance measures used in 
the sales people’s performance appraisal. Some 
things are measured twice.  
 The way in which the bonus results are 
communicated is perceived as ambiguous. 
Little information is provided about where each 
of the bonus percentages comes from. Then, 
sales people do not understand how bonuses are 
being calculated. 
 
Interesting 
quotes about 
the impact 
of 
performance 
measures, 
targets and 
incentives. 
 “I don’t really understand how I can truly affect my bonus. There are external factors […] 
that can severely reduce my bonus of which I have no control. Reports are available and 
like most things in this organisation if there’s a hard way to produce things we can find it!” 
  “[Target setting] is generally fair although some measures appear to be in the hands of the 
gods.” 
  “Too many targets that you have to keep reminding yourself of what they all are, 
particularly with the non sales focused targets” 
 “There is no negotiation; everybody is the same so everybody would have the same key 
performance indicators and targets, which I feel is very unfair. Not all the territories have 
the same potential” 
 “The problem is that the business only focuses on the scorecard and they are not paying 
attention to the other activities we do and record in our monthly report” 
 “I believe at the moment we are doing two different roles (traditional sales and account 
management) and we are only being measured in one (sales)” 
 “As you can see… what influence do I have on my contribution target. I don’t even know 
what it is yet!” 
 “Stretching targets are set - sometimes by those without market knowledge which can lead 
to unrealistic targets.” 
  “If you do your best one year, you know it’s going to penalise you in the following year” 
 “KPI`s are making co-operation between departments and colleagues difficult as some 
targets are the same and we are going for the same target but independently of each other.” 
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Table 15. Cement Company: Strengths and weaknesses of incentive system, performance 
measures and targets 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 The measures this company uses to assess sales 
people’s performance are: clear/easy to 
understand; objective; perceived as fair; few in 
number, and periodically reviewed. 
 The performance measures used for pay purposes 
are mainly sales volume and revenue based (there 
are other measures or performance not linked to 
pay such as calls made). These measures are not 
perceived to be the ‘right’ ones (e.g. customer 
retention and market share are critical for this 
company and they are not being measured), and 
they are not strategically aligned with the measures 
used by other departments (e.g. production). 
 Targets are perceived to be unachievable, and they 
are not reviewed periodically. 
 Sales people perceive that their targets are being 
‘given’ to them and that they have little control 
over them. 
 Sales people have difficulties understanding their 
performance targets and their bonus scheme. 
 The performance targets linked to the bonus 
scheme do not seem to be having an impact on 
sales people’s decision-making process or 
behaviour. 
 
Interesting 
quotes about 
the impact 
of 
performance 
measures, 
targets and 
incentives. 
 “Targets are set which most people can only influence in a very minor way, if at all - 
therefore virtually handicapping the person concerned” 
 “People work the system, they put down in their call reports that they’ve called and they 
haven’t called” 
 “When unrealistic targets are set, or when targets are imposed that you have no control 
over, it is often de-motivating” 
 “Targets that sales people have had no influence in setting or are unable to achieve are de-
motivational and lead to a sales force that is ‘coasting’ rather than ‘striving’ for better 
performance.” 
 “Personally I do not take too much notice of targets as they are not realistically 
achievable”. 
  “Targets are imposed by the company without any discussion or involvement of the sales 
person”. 
 “Overall there seems to be little interest, leading to a lack of motivation to achieve the 
targets and sometimes resentment based on the opinion that another part of the team has an 
‘easier’ target set.” 
 “The sales people have special product sales targets. These are constantly not met by most 
sales people. Nothing is talked about when we meet to improve these figures. These 
measures should be used not only as a measurement tool but also to identify weaknesses in 
our teams.” 
 “Not informed on how measures and targets are performing until period is over, this has a 
negative effect.” “By the time we are told what the target it is half the year has gone.” 
  “I believe the bonus scheme is a waste of time, as we have no real control over our 
targets”. 
 
 
 
 
The impact of performance targets on managerial behaviour                                                Page 87 
87 
 
Table 16. High Street Bank: Strengths and weaknesses of incentive system, performance measures 
and targets 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Performance is assessed according to 
different dimensions: An operational 
dimension and a financial dimension. 
 This company not only assess what 
performance has been achieved by each 
sales person, it also looks at how this 
performance has been achieved. 
 Performance measures are perceived to 
be objective and aligned with the 
company business strategy. 
 Sales people use the information 
extracted from their performance 
measures for decision-making purposes. 
 Every sales person perfectly understands 
how their performance is being assessed.  
 Sales people think that the performance 
measures they have are the appropriate 
ones. 
 The performance data use is perceived to 
be highly reliable. 
 All sales people are eligible to receive a 
bonus based on their performance 
according to four key performance 
measures.   
 Apart from the sales bonus scheme, this 
company has numerous recognition plans 
and contest that are positively perceived 
by sales people.  
 
 
 Some performance measures are perceived to be unfair as 
they favour specific sales territories.  
 Sales people have limited control over some of their 
performance measures as they are highly influenced by 
market factors. 
 Sales people perceived their targets to be extremely 
difficult to achieve.  
 Sales people have the perception that ‘the more you 
achieve the harder your target gets’. This perception 
reflects issues related with the ‘ratchet effect’. 
 This company takes into account a variety of factors in 
order to set more equitable targets for its sales people. 
However, sales people perceive that the targets are only 
based on past performance and that they are unfair for 
some individuals, especially those that over-achieve their 
targets. This relates back to the ratchet effect. 
 Targets are perceived to be “given”. Sales people do not 
seem to feel ownership of their targets.  
 The targets review period is considered to be too short 
(monthly). This may be affecting sales people’s planning 
process. 
 The company has two bonus structures, even though 
every sales person has the same role. One bonus structure 
is for new employees and the other is for people that have 
been with the company for a long time. The bonus 
structure for those that have been with the company for a 
long time has a cap at 120% of target. Sales people under 
this structure perceive that the cap des-motivate them to 
over-achieve their targets. 
 Sales people perceive the bonus system as difficult to 
understand. The measures use to determine pay changes 
too frequently.  
 The bonus is based on individual performance only and 
this is seen as a barrier for knowledge sharing among 
sales people.  
 This company complements its bonus scheme with 
recognition plans and performance contests, which are 
highly valued by sales people. However, they have 
difficulties recognising all the different plans and contests 
available and their individual purposes. 
Interesting 
quotes about 
the impact of 
performance 
measures, 
targets and 
incentives. 
  “If you work very hard and do very well you can be sure your target will be increased. 
Why bother? However if you just do what is necessary and no more your target will stay 
as is or decrease. Very unfair system.” 
 “Encouraging dysfunctional behaviour. (1) I won't go the extra mile because targets will 
be increased as a result. (2) I won't push to achieve over 130% of target. Because the 
bonus goes up in 10% increments after 130%. Should be structured to drive higher 
achievement.” 
 “If you are above target you feel really good about yourself and constantly have a ‘spring 
in your step’. If you are below target it has the opposite effect.” 
 “Targets in general give the sort of focus, which we all respond to. Some see them as 
goals to reach others see them as pressure”. 
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Appendix D: Study questionnaire 
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Cranfield School of Management Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
The purpose of this survey is to examine the impact of performance targets on 
sales people’s behaviour. The overall research to which this survey belongs is 
sponsored by CIMA (Chartered Institute of Management Accountants). 
Please read all the questions carefully and be as accurate as possible. The 
information you enter will be completely CONFIDENTIAL. Responses will only 
be reported based on averages. The estimated completion time is 15 minutes.  
 
Thank you for your participation! 
Best wishes,  
Monica Franco  
 
Cranfield School of Management 
MK43 0AL, Cranfield, Bedford 
Email: monica.franco@cranfield.ac.uk 
Phone: + 44 (0) 1234 751122 ext. 2926 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION!!!!! 
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Cranfield School of Management Questionnaire 
 
Reward philosophy 
Please indicate to what extent the following items apply to you. Str
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a. My base pay is dependent upon my work performance □ □ □ □ □ 
b. My bonus is dependent upon my work performance □ □ □ □ □ 
c. My boss will give me special recognition if my work performance is above 
target. □ □ □ □ □ 
d. My boss will increase my job responsibilities if my performance results are 
above target. □ □ □ □ □ 
e. Performance results above target are likely to affect my job promotion. □ □ □ □ □ 
f. Performance results below target are likely to affect my employee status (i.e. 
termination). □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Variable pay/bonus (CASH payments only) 
Please include the corresponding percentage in the blanks below. 
 
a. If I achieve my performance targets, this quarter my bonus will be _______ % of my base pay. 
b. According to my anticipated level of performance, this quarter my bonus will be _______ % of my base pay. 
 
 
 
Please indicate to what extent the following items apply to you. 
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c. My bonus is linked to a set of organisational performance targets □ □ □ □ □ 
d. My bonus is linked to a set of business unit/team performance targets □ □ □ □ □ 
e. My bonus is linked to a set of individual performance targets □ □ □ □ □ 
f. My bonus is linked to internal financial performance targets (e.g. profit, 
revenues, cost) □ □ □ □ □ 
g. My bonus is linked to external financial performance targets (e.g. market 
share, stock value) □ □ □ □ □ 
h. My bonus is linked to internal non-financial performance targets (e.g. 
productivity, safety, employee satisfaction) □ □ □ □ □ 
i. My bonus is linked to external non-financial performance targets (e.g. 
customer satisfaction, quality of service, environmental or community 
performance targets) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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Please indicate to what extent the following items apply to you. 
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j. My bonus is mainly determined by how well I achieve my financial 
performance targets □ □ □ □ □ 
k. My bonus is mainly determined by how well I perform according to my boss’ 
opinion □ □ □ □ □ 
l. My bonus performance targets are difficult to achieve □ □ □ □ □ 
m. I actively participate in the setting of my bonus performance targets □ □ □ □ □ 
n. I have control/influence over my bonus performance targets □ □ □ □ □ 
o. I take actions based on my bonus performance targets □ □ □ □ □ 
p. My bonus performance targets provide me with information about the results 
of my actions □ □ □ □ □ 
q. Based on my current performance, this quarter I will be above my 
performance targets □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Risk style 
Please answer the following five items by checking what you would feel comfortable with 
□ a1. An 80% chance of winning £4000, or □ a2. Receiving £3200 for sure 
□ b1. Receiving £3000 for sure, or □ b2. A 20% chance of winning £15000 
□ c1. A 90% chance of winning £2000, or □ c2. Receiving £1800 for sure 
□ d1. Receiving £1600 for sure, or □ d2. A 10% chance of winning £16000 
□ e1. A 50% chance of winning 5000, or □ e2. Receiving £2500 for sure 
 
Organisation’s cultural risk values 
Please indicate to what extent the following items apply to your organisation. 
St
ro
ng
ly
   
   
D
is
ag
re
e 
D
is
ag
re
e 
N
ei
th
er
 D
is
ag
re
e/
 
A
gr
ee
 
A
gr
ee
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 A
gr
ee
 
a. My organisation is quick to use improved work methods that are developed 
by workers. □ □ □ □ □ 
b. In my organisation, developing one’s own ideas is encouraged for the 
improvement of the corporation. □ □ □ □ □ 
c. Money is often available to get new project ideas off the ground.  □ □ □ □ □ 
d. People are often encouraged to take calculated risks with new ideas around 
here. □ □ □ □ □ 
e. In this organisation we seek to learn and develop from errors. □ □ □ □ □ 
f. This organisation supports many small and experimental projects realizing 
that some will undoubtedly fail. □ □ □ □ □ 
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Work discretion 
Please indicate to what extent the following items apply to you. 
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a. This organisation provides freedom to use my own judgment. □ □ □ □ □ 
b. This organisation provides the chance to do something that makes use of my 
abilities. □ □ □ □ □ 
c. I have the freedom to decide what I do in my job.  □ □ □ □ □ 
d. I have much autonomy in my job and I am left on my own to do my own 
work. □ □ □ □ □ 
e. I believe my employment security is at risk □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Time availability 
Please indicate to what extent the following items apply to you. 
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a. During the past three months, my work load was too heavy to spend time on 
developing new ideas □ □ □ □ □ 
b. I always seem to have plenty of time to get everything done □ □ □ □ □ 
c. I have just the right amount of time and work load to do everything well □ □ □ □ □ 
d. I feel that I am always working with time constraints on my job □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Organizational boundaries 
Please indicate to what extent the following items apply to you. 
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a. On my job I have no doubt of what is expected of me □ □ □ □ □ 
b. There is little uncertainty in my job □ □ □ □ □ 
c. My job description clearly specifies the standards of performance on which 
my job is evaluated □ □ □ □ □ 
d. I clearly know what level of work performance is expected from me in terms 
of amount, quality, and timeliness of output □ □ □ □ □ 
e. My supervisor helps me develop my career plans □ □ □ □ □ 
f. My supervisor provides me with ongoing feedback on my work performance □ □ □ □ □ 
g. My supervisor is a constant source of support □ □ □ □ □ 
h. My peers are a constant source of support □ □ □ □ □ 
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Organisational commitment 
Please indicate to what extent the following items apply to you. 
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a. I am quite proud to be able to tell people who it is I work for □ □ □ □ □ 
b. I sometimes feel like leaving this employment for good  □ □ □ □ □ 
c. I’m not willing to put myself out just to help the organization □ □ □ □ □ 
d. Even if the firm were not doing too well financially, I would be reluctant to 
change to another employer □ □ □ □ □ 
e. I feel myself to be part of the organization □ □ □ □ □ 
f. In my work I like to feel I am making some effort, not just for myself but for 
the organization as well □ □ □ □ □ 
g. The offer of a bit more money with another employer would not seriously 
make me think of changing my job □ □ □ □ □ 
h. I would not recommend a close friend to join our staff □ □ □ □ □ 
i. To know that my own work had made a contribution to the good of the 
organization would please me □ □ □ □ □ 
 
What are your overall views on the performance measures and targets used to assess sales 
people’s performance? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
How would you describe the effects that performance targets are having on sales people’s 
behaviour? Please give us some examples 
________________________________________________________________________ 
My gender is                
□ Male   □ Female       
I am _________years old 
My marital status is        
□ Married   □ Divorced   □ Separated  □ Single   □ Other          
Number of children _______  
I have worked for this company ______years 
My department name is____________________________ 
I am based in _________________ 
My job title is __________________________________ 
I have worked in this job  ________ years 
My annual family disposable income is…. 
□ Less than £15,000    
□ £15,001 - £30,000    
□ £30,001-£45,000   
□ £45,001-£60,000    
□ More than £60,000  
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Appendix E: Factor and reliability analyses of key 
study variables 
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Organisation’s cultural risk values 
This variable assesses the extent to which the organisational culture encourages 
employees to take risks. This variable is measured using six items extracted from 
Hornsby et al. (2000). The results of the factor analysis (using Varimax rotation) 
and reliability analysis of this variable are presented in the table below. 
Table 17. Factor and reliability analysis of ORGANISATION’S CULTURAL RISK VALUES 
Q3. Organisation’s cultural risk values Factor 1 
a. My organisation is quick to use improved work methods that are developed… .781 
b. In my organisation, developing one’s own ideas is encouraged… .788 
c. Money is often available to get new project ideas off the ground.  .719 
d. People are often encouraged to take calculated risks with new ideas around here. .801 
e. In this organisation we seek to learn and develop from errors. .688 
f. This organisation supports many small and experimental projects realizing… .698 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin .859 
Eigenvalues 3.349 
Cronbach’s alpha .841 
 
Work discretion 
In the questionnaire, this variable measures the extent to which sales people have 
autonomy in decision making. The variable is measured using four items extracted 
from Hornsby et al. (2000). The results of the factor analysis (using Varimax 
rotation) and reliability analysis of this variable are presented in the table below. 
Table 18. Factor and reliability analysis of WORK DISCRETION 
Q4. Work discretion  Factor 1 
a. This organisation provides freedom to use my own judgment. .790 
b. This organisation provides the chance to do something that makes… .799 
c. I have the freedom to decide what I do in my job.  .838 
d. I have much autonomy in my job and I am left on my own to do my… .766 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin .773 
Eigenvalues 2.553 
Cronbach’s alpha .810 
 
Time availability 
This variable assesses the extent to which sales people do not have role overload. 
The variable is measured using four items extracted from Hornsby et al. (2000). 
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The results of the factor analysis (using Varimax rotation) and reliability analysis 
of this variable are presented in the table below.  
Table 19. Factor and reliability analysis of TIME AVAILABILITY 
Q5. Time availability  Factor 1 
a. During the past three months, my work load was too heavy to spend time … .792 
b. I always seem to have plenty of time to get everything done .844 
c. I have just the right amount of time and work load to do everything well .842 
d. I feel that I am always working with time constraints on my job .665 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin .730 
Eigenvalues 2.491 
Cronbach’s alpha .788 
 
Role clarity 
The objective of this variable is to measure the extent to which sales people have a 
clear idea of what is expected of them. The variable is assessed using four items 
extracted from Hornsby et al. (2000). The results of the factor analysis (using 
Varimax rotation) and reliability analysis of this variable are presented in the table 
below.  
Table 20. Factor and reliability analysis of ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES – ROLE 
CLARITY 
Q6. Organisational boundaries – Role clarity Factor 1 
a. On my job I have no doubt of what is expected of me .638 
b. There is little uncertainty in my job .616 
c. My job description clearly specifies the standards of performance on which… .863 
d. I clearly know what level of work performance is expected from me in terms… .834 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin .703 
Eigenvalues 2.228 
Cronbach’s alpha .711 
Support 
This variable examines the extent to which support from supervisors and peers is 
available in the organisation. This variable is assessed with four items adapted 
from Ito and Brotheridge (2005). The results of the factor analysis (using Varimax 
rotation) and reliability analysis of this variable are presented in the table below.  
Table 21. Factor and reliability analysis of ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES – SUPPORT 
Q6. Organisational boundaries – Support Factor 1 
e. My supervisor helps me develop my career plans .850 
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Q6. Organisational boundaries – Support Factor 1 
f. My supervisor provides me with ongoing feedback on my work performance .851 
g. My supervisor is a constant source of support .849 
h. My peers are a constant source of support .601 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin .754 
Eigenvalues 2.528 
Cronbach’s alpha .804 
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Appendix F: Descriptive statistics 
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The following tables show the descriptive statistics obtained in the sales people’s survey conducted in the four case study 
companies. 
Table 22. Descriptive statistics of likert scale and continuous variables (all companies) 
Variable/question All companies High Street Bank Gas Company Cement Company Media Company 
N Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
REWARD PHILOSOPHY                  
a. My base pay is 
dependent upon my 
work performance 
95 1 5 2.78 1.23 23 2.74 1.21 22 2.73 1.08 22 2.68 1.32 28 2.93 1.33 
b. My bonus is dependent 
upon my work 
performance 
95 1 5 3.73 1.11 23 4.22 1.09 22 3.91 0.81 22 3.23 1.11 28 3.57 1.17 
c. My boss will give me 
special recognition if 
my work performance 
is above target 
95 1 5 3.25 1.08 23 3.30 1.15 22 3.05 1.13 22 2.86 1.04 28 3.68 0.90 
d. My boss will increase 
my job responsibilities 
if my performance 
results are above target 
95 1 5 2.95 0.96 23 2.91 0.90 22 2.68 0.95 22 2.73 0.94 28 3.36 0.95 
e. Performance results 
above target are likely 
to affect my job 
promotion 
95 1 5 3.09 0.98 23 3.04 0.88 22 3.14 1.08 22 2.82 0.91 28 3.32 1.02 
f. Performance results 
below target are likely 
to affect my employee 
status (i.e. termination) 
95 1 5 2.98 0.96 23 3.48 0.90 22 2.91 0.97 22 2.64 0.90 28 2.89 0.92 
VARIABLE PAY/BONUS                  
c. My bonus is linked to a 
set of organisational 
performance targets 
95 1 5 3.71 0.94 23 3.74 0.81 22 3.64 0.85 22 3.73 0.77 28 3.71 1.24 
d. My bonus is linked to a 
set of business 
95 1 5 3.83 0.87 23 3.48 0.79 22 3.55 0.91 22 3.73 0.88 28 4.43 0.57 
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Variable/question All companies High Street Bank Gas Company Cement Company Media Company 
unit/team performance 
targets 
e. My bonus is linked to a 
set of individual 
performance targets 
95 1 5 3.09 1.28 23 4.09 0.51 22 4.00 0.62 22 2.36 1.05 28 2.14 1.21 
f. My bonus is linked to 
internal financial 
performance targets 
95 1 5 3.43 1.08 23 3.26 0.81 22 3.77 0.69 22 3.32 1.29 28 3.39 1.31 
g. My bonus is linked to 
external financial 
performance targets 
95 1 5 2.25 0.96 23 2.74 1.10 22 2.32 0.72 22 1.82 0.85 28 2.14 0.93 
h. My bonus is linked to 
internal non-financial 
performance targets 
95 1 5 2.24 0.95 23 2.57 0.99 22 2.68 0.89 22 1.95 0.72 28 1.86 0.93 
i. My bonus is linked to 
external non-financial 
performance targets 
95 1 5 2.09 0.86 23 2.13 0.76 22 2.59 0.85 22 1.91 0.68 28 1.82 0.94 
j. My bonus is mainly 
determined by how well 
I achieve my financial 
performance targets 
95 1 5 3.54 1.16 23 4.22 0.80 22 3.73 0.83 22 2.68 1.21 28 3.50 1.20 
k. My bonus is mainly 
determined by how well 
I perform according to 
my boss' opinion 
95 1 5 2.41 1.10 23 2.39 0.89 22 3.64 0.73 22 1.91 0.61 28 1.86 1.04 
l. My bonus performance 
targets are difficult to 
achieve 
95 1 5 3.43 0.88 23 3.65 0.71 22 3.50 0.80 22 3.55 1.14 28 3.11 0.79 
m. I actively participate in 
the setting of my bonus 
performance targets 
95 1 5 2.28 1.16 23 1.91 1.04 22 2.27 1.03 22 2.36 1.18 28 2.54 1.32 
n. I have control/influence 
over my bonus 
performance targets 
95 1 5 2.15 1.01 23 1.78 1.04 22 2.32 0.95 22 2.27 0.98 28 2.21 1.03 
o. I take actions based on 
my bonus performance 
targets 
94 1 5 3.47 0.96 22 3.45 1.06 22 3.77 0.92 22 3.14 0.99 28 3.50 0.84 
p. My bonus performance 95 1 5 3.02 1.03 23 3.35 0.98 22 3.27 1.03 22 2.50 0.96 28 2.96 1.00 
The impact of performance targets on managerial behaviour                                                                                                                                    Page 101 
101 
Variable/question All companies High Street Bank Gas Company Cement Company Media Company 
targets provide me with 
information about the 
results of my actions 
q. Based on my current 
performance, this 
quarter I will be above 
my performance targets 
95 1 5 2.95 0.98 23 3.43 0.90 22 3.14 0.77 22 2.36 0.90 28 2.86 1.04 
ORGANISATION’S 
CULTURAL VALUES 
                 
a. My organisation is 
quick to use improved 
work methods that are 
developed by workers 
95 1 5 2.89 1.05 23 2.74 0.92 22 2.32 0.99 22 2.59 0.91 28 3.71 0.81 
b. In my organisation, 
developing one's own 
ideas is encouraged for 
the improvement of the 
corporation 
95 1 5 3.52 0.97 23 3.22 0.90 22 3.27 1.03 22 3.45 0.91 28 4.00 0.86 
c. Money is often 
available to get new 
project ideas off the 
ground 
95 1 5 2.53 0.97 23 2.22 0.95 22 2.32 0.84 22 2.50 0.96 28 2.96 0.96 
d. People are often 
encouraged to take 
calculated risks with 
new ideas around here 
95 1 5 2.74 0.95 23 2.35 0.78 22 2.45 0.86 22 2.36 0.79 28 3.57 0.74 
e. In this organisation we 
seek to learn and 
develop from errors 
95 1 5 3.31 0.96 23 2.91 0.90 22 2.86 1.04 22 3.50 0.91 28 3.82 0.67 
f. This organisation 
supports many small 
and experimental 
projects realizing that 
some will undoubtedly 
fail 
95 1 5 2.73 0.94 23 2.39 0.72 22 2.73 0.94 22 2.45 0.91 28 3.21 0.96 
WORK DISCRETION                  
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Variable/question All companies High Street Bank Gas Company Cement Company Media Company 
a. This organisation 
provides freedom to use 
my own judgment 
95 1 5 3.72 0.90 23 3.48 1.20 22 3.55 1.01 22 3.77 0.75 28 4.00 0.47 
b. This organisation 
provides the chance to 
do something that 
makes use of my 
abilities 
95 1 5 3.68 0.82 23 3.78 0.80 22 3.18 0.96 22 3.86 0.64 28 3.86 0.71 
c. I have the freedom to 
decide what I do in my 
job 
95 1 5 3.52 0.93 23 3.43 0.99 22 3.18 1.10 22 3.77 0.75 28 3.64 0.83 
d. I have much autonomy 
in my job and I am left 
on my own to do my 
own work 
95 1 5 3.66 0.89 23 3.26 1.14 22 3.73 1.03 22 3.91 0.61 28 3.75 0.65 
e. I believe my 
employment security is 
at risk 
95 1 5 2.78 1.07 23 2.78 1.17 22 3.50 1.10 22 2.41 0.73 28 2.50 0.96 
TIME AVAILABILITY                  
a. During the past three 
months, my work load 
wasn’t too heavy to 
spend time developing 
new ideas 
95 1 5 2.56 1.05 23 2.78 1.00 22 2.05 0.72 22 2.64 1.18 28 2.71 1.12 
b. I always seem to have 
plenty of time to get 
everything done 
95 1 4 2.18 0.80 23 2.09 0.79 22 2.09 0.53 22 2.00 0.76 28 2.46 0.96 
c. I have just the right 
amount of time and 
work load to do 
everything well 
95 1 4 2.48 0.84 23 2.57 0.90 22 2.36 0.58 22 2.27 0.88 28 2.68 0.90 
d. I feel that I am always 
working with no time 
constraints on my job 
95 1 5 2.53 0.87 23 2.35 0.71 22 2.23 0.87 22 2.82 0.80 28 2.68 0.98 
ORGANISATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES 
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Variable/question All companies High Street Bank Gas Company Cement Company Media Company 
a. On my job I have no 
doubt of what is 
expected of me 
93 1 5 3.88 0.83 23 4.13 0.55 22 3.91 0.75 22 3.86 0.83 26 3.65 1.06 
b. There is little 
uncertainty in my job 
93 1 5 3.18 1.00 23 3.48 0.90 22 3.05 1.09 22 3.32 0.89 26 2.92 1.06 
c. My job description 
clearly specifies the 
standards of 
performance on which 
my job is evaluated 
93 1 5 3.49 0.83 23 3.61 0.72 22 3.55 0.60 22 3.55 1.01 26 3.31 0.93 
d. I clearly know what 
level of work 
performance is 
expected from me in 
terms of amount, 
quality, and timeliness 
of output 
93 1 5 3.68 0.75 23 3.83 0.72 22 3.82 0.39 22 3.45 0.91 26 3.62 0.85 
e. My supervisor helps me 
develop my career plans 
93 1 5 3.18 0.99 23 2.96 1.02 22 3.09 1.27 22 3.18 0.73 26 3.46 0.86 
f. My supervisor provides 
me with ongoing 
feedback on my work 
performance 
93 1 5 3.52 0.94 23 3.57 1.08 22 3.59 0.85 22 3.27 0.98 26 3.62 0.85 
g. My supervisor is a 
constant source of 
support 
93 1 5 3.62 0.90 23 3.39 1.16 22 3.64 0.85 22 3.82 0.73 26 3.65 0.80 
h. My peers are a constant 
source of support 
93 2 5 3.76 0.77 23 3.70 0.82 22 3.86 0.64 22 3.59 0.85 26 3.88 0.77 
ORGANISATIONAL 
COMMITMENT 
                 
a. I am quite proud to be 
able to tell people who 
it is I work for 
95 2 5 4.18 0.68 23 4.04 0.64 22 4.27 0.83 22 4.14 0.56 28 4.25 0.70 
b. I sometimes feel like 
DON'T leaving this 
employment for good 
95 1 5 3.21 1.01 23 3.17 1.11 22 3.14 0.94 22 3.50 1.01 28 3.07 0.98 
c. I'm willing to put my 95 1 5 4.14 0.75 23 4.09 0.67 22 4.00 1.02 22 4.27 0.55 28 4.18 0.72 
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Variable/question All companies High Street Bank Gas Company Cement Company Media Company 
self out just to help the 
organisation 
d. Even if the firm were 
not doing too well 
financially, I would be 
reluctant to change to 
another employer 
95 1 5 3.36 0.98 23 3.00 0.90 22 3.68 0.95 22 3.64 1.00 28 3.18 0.94 
e. I feel myself to be part 
of the organisation 
95 1 5 3.86 0.81 23 3.74 0.96 22 3.77 0.75 22 3.95 0.65 28 3.96 0.84 
f. In my work I like to 
feel I am making some 
effort, not just for 
myself but for the 
organisation as well 
95 2 5 4.19 0.66 23 4.22 0.67 22 3.91 0.75 22 4.27 0.46 28 4.32 0.67 
g. The offer of a bit more 
money with another 
employer would not 
seriously make me 
think of changing my 
job 
95 1 5 3.45 0.97 23 3.26 1.05 22 3.41 1.05 22 4.00 0.62 28 3.21 0.92 
h. I would recommend a 
close friend to join our 
staff 
95 1 5 3.68 0.98 23 3.74 0.92 22 3.68 1.21 22 4.00 0.76 28 3.39 0.96 
i. To know that my own 
work had made a 
contribution to the good 
of the organisation 
would please me 
95 2 5 4.23 0.59 23 4.26 0.54 22 4.18 0.73 22 4.18 0.39 28 4.29 0.66 
Age 90 21 62 39.25 10.68 20 40.05 11.65 21 42.00 8.11 21 47.0
0 
9.74 28 30.8
2 
5.93 
Number of children 83 0 7 1.28 1.36 20 1.55 1.73 17 14.41 8.88 21 1.71 1.19 24 0.29 0.55 
Years in this company 81 0.3 37. 10.17 8.99 20 10.58 10.56 18 1.78 1.22 21 13.8
1 
7.86 23 3.36 2.97 
Experience in this job 88 0 22 5.12 5.27 21 5.31 5.45 19 7.87 5.64 21 6.55 5.95 27 1.93 1.79 
 
